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ABSTRACT 
When a community is plagued by violence, the natural tendency is to determine 
how to change or reduce the violence levels.  In the process, an equally important 
question of why violence occurs is often overlooked.  This thesis analyzes the why with 
respect to violence levels in Salinas, California.   
In order to determine specific environmental factors that affect violence in 
Salinas, the authors postulate nine broad independent variables (IVs) for analysis:  
Economy; Population; Housing; Education; Police Force; Prison Influence; Gang 
Rivalry; Social Service Programs; and Community Involvement.  Components of these 
independent variables were compared to the violence rate per capita in Salinas to 
determine which environmental factors influence violence in Salinas.   
Although data was not available for all of the IVs, the authors determined that the 
following factors influence violence in Salinas:  the unemployment rate, average persons 
per household, vacant housing units, housing units per capita, the high school dropout 
rate, the high school graduation rate, the school average daily attendance, and the school 
budget.  To lower overall violence levels, officials in Salinas should focus on: reducing 
the unemployment rate, the number of vacant housing units, and the high school dropout 
rate; and increasing the high school graduation rate and average daily attendance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
When a community is plagued by violence, the natural tendency is to determine 
how to change or reduce the violence levels.  The focus is typically centered on violence 
suppression, such as police action or prosecution, or violence prevention programs.  In 
the process, an equally important question of why violence occurs is often overlooked.  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the why with respect to violence levels in Salinas, 
California.  This paper aims to determine which, if any, environmental factors, such as 
the economy, the population, the police force, or community involvement, directly affect 
the violence level in Salinas, California.     
B. BACKGROUND 
Salinas, California is a primarily agricultural city located approximately 8 miles 
east of the Monterey Bay and 55 miles south of San Jose.  It is the largest city in 
Monterey County, and is the county seat.  The fertile Salinas Valley is one of the richest 
farming regions in California, producing a multitude of fruits, vegetables, and wine 
grapes in a nearly $4 billion agriculture industry.  Over 80 percent of the lettuce produced 
in the United States is grown there, earning the Salinas Valley the nickname “Salad Bowl 
of the World.”1  The agricultural industry requires a robust employment base, and 
thousands of migrant workers from Mexico travel to the Salinas Valley annually during 
the growing season to earn money for their families.   
The population of Salinas exploded from 1980 to 2000, going from 80,438 to 
151,060.2  Part of this boom occurred due to soaring home prices in the Monterey and 
San Jose areas, where many middle income employees could not find affordable housing.  
                                                 
1 City of Salinas, “History of Salinas,” http://www.ci.salinas.ca.us/visitors/history.cfm. 
2 State of the Cities Data Systems, “SOCDS Census Data: Salinas, CA,” http://socds.huduser.org/. 
 2
Salinas offered lower home prices and convenient highway access for commuters.3  But 
the lower home prices did not last.  As demand increased for housing in Salinas, home 
prices skyrocketed.  This phenomenon occurred throughout California, creating some of 
the most expensive real estate in the United States in the late 1990s.  The lower income 
residents of Salinas were hit extremely hard by the trend, adding to other woes including 
a high unemployment rate and low-paying jobs.  The combination of these factors caused 
a high population density in some areas of Salinas, particularly the eastern portions of the 
city, and forced extended families to share inadequately small spaces.4  Population 
stabilization occurred in the 2000s, and the 2009 population estimate is 152,597.5   
The racial demographics also varied over the years, with a large increase in the 
Hispanic population and a corresponding decrease of other races from 1980 until present.  
In 1980, the racial breakdown in Salinas included 52% Caucasian, 38% Hispanic, 8.2% 
other, and 1.7% African-American.6  In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated the 
racial demographics as 70% Hispanic, 18.6% Caucasian, 9.6% other, and 1.8% African-
American.7 
The population increase in Salinas also included a rise in street gang membership.  
Since at least 1960, Salinas has been plagued by gang violence.  In his “90-Day Report to 
the Community,” Chief of Police Louis Fetherolf reviewed the history of gang problems 
in Salinas.  Highlights included:  gang fights reaching ‘epidemic proportions’ in 1960; 
gunfire, roaming gangs, and murders in the 1970s; deteriorating relations with the Latino 
community in the 1980s; gang attacks, homicides, and home fire bombings in 1991; a 
then record-setting 24 homicides in 1994; and a new record of 25 homicides in 2008, 
                                                 
3 Laurie Giesen, “Salinas Growing Northeast,” The Salinas Californian, June 27, 2000, 
http://www.chispahousing.org/pdf/salinasgrowingnortheast.pdf. 
4 Larry Cohen and Jeane Erlenborn, “Cultivating Peace in Salinas: A Framework for Violence 
Prevention,” June 1999, http://www.preventioninstitute.org/pdf/Cultivating_Peace.pdf, 3. 
5 California Department of Finance, “January 2009 City Population Ranked by Size, Numeric and 
Percent Change,” http://www.dof.ca.gov/. 
6 State of the Cities Data Systems, “SOCDS Census Data: Salinas, CA.”  
7 U.S. Census Bureau, “Fact Sheet: Salinas city, California,” http://factfinder.census.gov/. 
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including 23 attributed to gang violence.8  As of December 11, 2009, Salinas eclipsed its 
record again with 28 homicides, all of them gang-related.     
The increase in gang membership over the years has three main components.  
First, as young gang members age, get married, and have children, they do not 
necessarily quit their gangs for more licit occupations.  The children are exposed to the 
gang as a normal facet of the family life and often follow their parents’ footsteps into the 
gang.  Working for the gang is simply another industry or occupation, similar to law 
enforcement, military service, or agriculture.  In Salinas it is common to see third- and 
even fourth-generation gang members.   
A second significant factor in the gang membership increase in Salinas, and 
Monterey County as a whole, is the close proximity of Salinas Valley State Prison 
(SVSP), 22 miles south of Salinas.  In the 1970s, most of the gangs in Salinas fell under 
the Norteño gang umbrella.  Norteños are primarily second- or third-generation Mexican-
American gangsters in northern California.9  The Nuestra Familia (NF) prison gang, 
which uses the Norteños as its foot soldiers, had a large presence in SVSP.  Newly 
incarcerated individuals at SVSP, even if not affiliated as gang members, typically 
aligned themselves with NF to survive.  Once released, they carried out orders and 
instructions from NF and further indoctrinated themselves into the gang culture.10   
The Norteños’ main rivals, the Sureños, are primarily Latino gangsters in the 
urban cities in southern California.  In Salinas, Sureños are typically recent immigrants or 
children of migrant farm workers.11  The earliest Sureño gang in Salinas appeared in the 
late 1970s, formed by migrant males repeatedly victimized by the Norteños.12  Previous 
geographical dividing lines diminished with the incarcerations of Norteños and Sureños 
                                                 
8 Louis Fetherolf, “90-Day Report to the Community,” July 21, 2009, 
http://www.ci.salinas.ca.us/services/police/pdf/90-DayReport-071909.pdf, 6. 
9 Zachary Stahl, “The Loading Zone,” Monterey County Weekly, October 29–November 4, 2009, 17. 
10 Brian Parry, “California Prisons and Street Gangs” (briefing presented at the annual California 
Gang Investigators Association National Gang Violence conference, Anaheim, California, July 22, 2009). 
11 Stahl, “The Loading Zone,” 17. 
12 California Department of Justice Bureau of Investigations and Intelligence, “Gangs Threat 
Assessment: Salinas, California,” September 2009, 8. 
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at prisons throughout California.  SVSP, formerly a NF and Norteño stronghold, has been 
integrated with Sureños because of overcrowding in all California prisons.  Additionally, 
to help quell prison violence, California has to balance the numbers of various gang 
factions within the prisons to prevent gang-related incidents.13  This forced integration in 
the prisons extends to the surrounding communities, as gang members and families 
sometimes relocate to be near an incarcerated gang member.14  Salinas is a natural choice 
for relocation since it offers jobs and community and social services.  The Salinas Police 
Department (PD) estimates the current ratio of Norteños to Sureños at around 60 percent 
to 40 percent, respectively.15   
The third factor in the rise in gang membership is the gang culture itself.  Gangs 
have evolved as a type of identity, work, and association for American youths, and 
provide a structuring role in many facets of life.16  Young Americans are drawn to gangs 
for many reasons:  the sense of belonging, identity, and fellowship that gangs embody; 
the aspect of protection from bullies and other gang members; the perception of an 
exciting lifestyle and culture; the opportunity to make money or gain access to drugs; and 
the expectation that being a gang member will equal power and prestige.  Gangs fill a 
void in the lives of alienated youths, helping them overcome factors such as racism, 
oppression, poverty, and neglect.  Gangs help the powerless feel in control, even if only 
in a small territorial space; they offer security and enforce racial or ethnic borders in their 
territory; they control access to earning opportunities, jobs, and housing in their 
jurisdiction; and they provide their members with a sense of “warrior glamour.”17  Gangs 
play an important role in a member’s life, offering services and opportunities unavailable 
                                                 
13 Brian Parry, “California Prisons and Street Gangs” (briefing presented at the annual California 
Gang Investigators Association National Gang Violence conference, Anaheim, California, July 22, 2009). 
14 Cohen and Erlenborn, “Cultivating Peace in Salinas,” 12. 
15 CA DOJ, “Gangs Threat Assessment: Salinas, California,” 12. 
16 Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, 2nd ed. (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 
2004), 67. 
17 Mike Davis, “Reading John Hagedorn,” in A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gangsta 
Culture, by John Hagedorn (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), xi. 
 5
or unattainable from the local community or government.  In Salinas, the gang problem is 
so institutionalized that the gangs there recruit kids as young as elementary school age.18  
Current numbers vary, but authorities estimate between 3,000 and 3,500 active 
gang members in Salinas.19  Additionally, there are an estimated 2,000 inactive gang 
members, and between 3,000 and 5,000 family members involved.20  Using the more 
conservative figure of 3,000 gang members out of Salinas’ population of 152,597, gang 
members represent nearly two percent of the Salinas population.  The “National Gang 
Threat Assessment, 2009” (NGTA) estimates United States gang membership at just over 
one million as of September 2008, including 900,000 gang members in local 
communities and 147,000 in prisons.21  Using a rough U.S. population estimate of 304 
million in September 2008,22 the NGTA’s 1.047 million estimate translates to gang 
members comprising 0.344 percent of the U.S. population.  Based on this, the rate of 
gang members in Salinas is almost six times the national average.  Even using a more 
robust estimate of a one percent rate of gang members in the United States, Salinas is still 
double the national average.23 
According to the NGTA:  most gangs are violent and commit a number of crimes, 
including drug distribution; the expansion of gang influence increases crime and violence 
in communities; criminal gangs commit as much as 80 percent of crime in a community, 
including alien smuggling, armed robbery, assault, auto theft, drug trafficking, extortion, 
                                                 
18 Salinas Police Department estimate, April 9, 2009. 
19 In his “90-Day Report,” Chief Fetherolf notes, “There are an estimated 3,500 gang members or 
associates in Monterey County, most of them living in Salinas” (p. 7).   
20 Salinas Police Department estimate, April 9, 2009. 
21 U.S. Department of Justice National Gang Intelligence Center, “National Gang Threat Assessment 
2009,” January 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs32/32146/32146p.pdf, 6. 
22 As of September 25, 2009, the U.S. Census Bureau’s U.S. Population Clock (POPClock) Projection 
estimated the U.S. population at 307,544,236, retrieved at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html.  The POPClock assumes a net gain of one 
person in the U.S. every 10 seconds, which equates to an additional 3,153,600 people in the U.S. since 
September 2008.  Subtracting the two estimates results in a rough U.S. population estimate of 304,000,000 
in September 2008. 
23 Matthew O’Deane, “Gangs 101” (briefing presented at the annual California Gang Investigators 
Association National Gang Violence conference, Anaheim, California, July 20, 2009). In this brief, 
Investigator O’Deane indicated that as a general rule, authorities can estimate that one percent of any given 
population are gang members. 
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fraud, murder, and weapons trafficking; and gangs are the “primary retail-level 
distributors of most illegal drugs.”24  Salinas is no exception to these statistics.  Salinas 
gangs commit crimes including auto theft, burglary, identity theft, aggravated assault, 
homicide, drug trafficking and sales, and robbery.25  Based on Salinas PD crime reports, 
gangs have been responsible for the majority of homicides, drive-by shootings, and 
firearms crimes since 2002.26  In the same timeframe, gangs committed approximately 25 
percent of the total number of violent crimes in Salinas each year.27  In other words, two 
percent of the population commits 25 percent of the violent crimes.   
As shown in Figure 1, Salinas has been higher than both the U.S. and California 
levels for violent crimes per capita since 1993.  The homicide rate in Salinas has been 
much more random, making it difficult to predict how many homicides will occur from 
one year to the next.  As shown in Figure 2, the number of annual homicides over the 
period from 1980 to 2008 ranged from a low of two in 1983 to a high of 25 in 2008.28  
Naturally homicides receive more attention than other violent crimes, even though they 
typically represent less than two percent of the total number of violent crimes each year 
in Salinas.  The statistics in Salinas for 2008 and 2009 are chilling:  23 of the 25 
homicides in 2008 and all 28 homicides so far in 2009 are classified as gang-related.29  
For 2009, all of the victims have been male, ranging in age from 14 to 36.  Thirteen are 
identified as current or former Norteños, ten are identified current or former Sureños, 
three are identified as cases of mistaken identity with no actual gang affiliation, and two 
are pending classification.30 
                                                 
24 USDOJ National Gang Intelligence Center, “National Gang Threat Assessment 2009,” iii. 
25 CA DOJ, “Gangs Threat Assessment: Salinas, California,” 9. 
26 Salinas Police Department, Salinas Crime Reports, 1993–2009. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Salinas Police Department, Salinas Crime Reports, 1980–2008. 
29 CA DOJ, “Gangs Threat Assessment: Salinas, California,” 9. 
30 Ibid., and Salinas Police Department reports. 
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Figure 2.   Salinas homicides, 1980-200832 
                                                 
31 United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/Local/JurisbyJuris.cfm.  
32 Salinas Police Department, Salinas Crime Reports, 1980–2008. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The city of Salinas has tried several approaches to decrease the number of violent 
crimes committed each year.  These approaches included increasing the number of 
kinetic police operations for focused time periods; establishing a Violence Suppression 
Unit in the Police Department; requesting grant money from the federal government to 
emplace new initiatives; and partnering with outside agencies to develop strategies for 
reducing violence.  Although violence per capita has been on a downswing since the 
highs in the mid-1990s, Salinas has yet to reduce violence to the point of being below the 
national and California averages.  Additionally, several initiatives disappeared over time 
due to resource constraints. 
Following the violence spike that lasted from 1984-1993, Salinas received outside 
help.  In 1995, the federal government awarded the Salinas PD a nearly $1 million grant 
as part of the Community Oriented Policing Service Youth Firearms Violence Initiative.  
Salinas used this grant to make their anti-gang task force a full-time effort and formed a 
Police/Community Advisory Commission to “involve the community in crime reduction 
strategies.”33  Other initiatives included the creation of the Salinas PD Violence 
Suppression Unit (VSU); the establishment of the Violent Injury Prevention Program; the 
introduction of PeaceBuilders, a prevention program aimed at elementary school 
children; and the formation of 20 neighborhood cleanup programs.34  The results of these 
initiatives appeared promising.  In 1995 the Salinas PD attributed 18.43 percent of all 
violent crime to gang activity; by 2000, that figure decreased to 10.98 percent.  However, 
the trend reversed significantly, with the percentage of gang violent crime at 16.22, 
21.17, and 24.16 respectively from 2001 to 2003.35  
                                                 
33 GunCite, “Success Stories,” http://www.guncite.com/success.htm. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Salinas Police Department, Salinas Crime Reports, 1993–2008. 
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In 1999, the city of Salinas and Partners for Peace36 commissioned the Prevention 
Institute37 to help “identify and analyze the underlying issues” of violence in Salinas, as 
well as “design a strategy for violence prevention.”38  This strategy, entitled “Cultivating 
Peace in Salinas,” focused on reducing youth violence but also addressed the overall 
well-being of the community.  “The intent of the framework is to provide a snapshot of 
community assets and needs and chart out the kinds of long-term efforts needed to 
prevent and reduce violence.”39  The framework “represents a vision of creating a 
community culture of caring in Salinas,” a vision “of community compassion, of respect 
and responsibility.”40  The framework also emphasized a public health, or 
“comprehensive,” approach to reducing violence, recognizing that criminal justice alone 
could not solve the problem.41 
To develop the framework, the collaborative process included focus groups, 
partnerships, and a survey regarding community perceptions of violence in Salinas.  
Among other things, the survey gauged respondents’ impressions of six types of 
violence:  gang violence, domestic violence, gun violence, child abuse, sexual violence, 
and bullying.42  Of all survey respondents, 89 percent perceived gang violence to be the 
most prevalent form of violence in Salinas and the primary concern.43  At the time of the 
survey, it was estimated that Salinas had 16 street gangs with approximately 1,500 to 
2,000 members.44 
                                                 
36 Partners for Peace is a non-profit organization in Salinas, California, dedicated to youth violence 
prevention.  The group focuses on literacy, education, youth employment, gang prevention, and providing 
services to families.  
37 Prevention Institute is a non-profit organization in Oakland, California, working to improve the 
health and well-being of communities through comprehensive prevention programs, created in 
collaboration through local policy development.  See www.preventioninstitute.org. 
38 Cohen and Erlenborn, “Cultivating Peace in Salinas,” i. 
39 Ibid., iv. 
40 Ibid., 2. 
41 Ibid., 4. 
42 Ibid., 5–6. 
43 Ibid., 6. 
44 Ibid., 6. 
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The survey respondents also identified what they perceived as the largest risk 
factors for violence in Salinas:  alcohol and other drugs; family dynamics (unsupportive 
home life or physical/psychological abuse); witnessing and experiencing violence; the 
media (portrayal of violence as commonplace); economics (poverty, high unemployment, 
community deterioration); guns (readily available); incarceration (proximity to 
incarcerated gang members and violent subculture); oppression (sexism, racism, 
discrimination); literacy rates; and truancy.45  As noted in the framework, “If violence is 
seen as typical and is reinforced by the media, family, community, or school, it will occur 
with greater frequency and lethality.”46 
After determining the primary risk factors for Salinas, the Prevention Institute and 
the focus groups developed a Spectrum of Prevention and Recommendations for Salinas.  
The recommendations included:  invest in early childhood and parent support initiatives; 
improve literacy rates; develop initiatives to promote positive community values; develop 
a strategy to reduce gang violence; develop collaboration between city, county, and 
school districts for plan implementation; increase after-school and recreation activities; 
reduce truancy; prioritize economic development and job training for youth; and develop 
public policies to address alcohol as a risk factor for violence and gun regulations.47 
Following the release of the “Cultivating Peace in Salinas” framework, things 
looked positive for Salinas.  The Packard Foundation provided a $1 million grant to 
implement the framework,48 and Partners for Peace secured an $8 million grant for the 
federal Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Initiative for three years.49  The SS/HS 
Initiative involved 14 partner organizations around Monterey County, including the 
school districts, the Monterey County Department of Health, and community 
                                                 
45 Cohen and Erlenborn, “Cultivating Peace in Salinas,” 9–13. 
46 Ibid., 17. 
47 Ibid., 22. 
48 Jessica Lyons, “The Packard Foundation Has Made a Mark on Global Philanthropy, Nowhere More 
Profoundly Than in Monterey County,” Monterey County Weekly, October 25, 2001, 
http://www.montereycountyweekly.com. 
49 Safe Schools, Healthy Students, “Salinas SS/HS Initiative Reaches Into Every Corner of the 
Community,” http://www.sshs.samhsa.gov/initiative/spotlight_salinas.aspx. 
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organizations.  Programs implemented under the SS/HS Initiative covered a wide swath:  
gang intervention, after-school programs, parent education, school resource officers to 
combat truancy and bullying, substance abuse prevention, and early childhood 
socialization.50  Crime rates and the level of fear in the community decreased, and safety 
in downtown Salinas increased.51  But once again, the positive gains abated over time.  
The SS/HS Initiative and other grants expired, replacement funds were unavailable to 
continue the SS/HS programs, and prevention programs lost attention and resources in 
favor of intervention and enforcement programs.52  Although the violence levels per 
capita were lower in 2008 than in 1999 (6.574 vs. 8.012, respectively),53 Salinas 
continues to run well above the California and United States averages (see Figure 1). 
The latest initiatives to reduce violence include the Community Alliance for 
Safety and Peace (CASP) and Operation Ceasefire.  CASP is a think-tank of law 
enforcement groups, educators, business and community leaders.54  CASP plans to 
engage consultants from San Jose to draft a strategic peace plan.55  Operation Ceasefire, a 
national program that began in Boston, offers high-risk gang members jobs and 
employment training in return for quitting gang life.56  These programs are in their 
infancy stages, therefore no data is available regarding their effectiveness in reducing 
violence levels. 
                                                 
50 Safe Schools, Healthy Students, “Salinas SS/HS Initiative.” 
51 Sonia Lee, Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz, and Larry Cohen, “Revisiting Cultivating Peace in Salinas:  A 
Framework for Violence Prevention,” July 2008, 1. 
52 Ibid., 1. 
53 See Appendix C, Table 4. 
54 Zachary Stahl, “Saving Salinas,” Monterey County Weekly, March 26, 2009, 
http://www.montereycountyweekly.com. 
55 Stahl, “The Loading Zone,” 17. 




1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this thesis is violence per capita in Salinas, with a 
related question of “Why has the violence rate increased or decreased over time?”  The 
United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) classifies violent crime as homicides, 
assaults, rape, and robbery.57  However, for this research violence will only include 
assaults, robberies, and homicides.  Omitting rapes does not significantly alter the 
resultant data due to the relatively small numbers of rapes that occur in Salinas each year, 
typically averaging around five percent of total violent crimes.  Additionally, the Salinas 
Crime Reports focused on gang-related activity do not include rapes.  Although rapes 
outnumbered homicides for each year of the data presented, homicides are included 
because of the exponential increase in homicides in the last two years and the significant 
amount of attention that homicides receive. 
Looking over the period from 1980 to 2008, assaults comprised about 67 percent 
of the violence in Salinas on average, robberies about 32 percent and homicides about 
1.25 percent.  Assault is defined as  
[a]n unlawful physical attack or threat of attack.  Assaults may be 
classified as aggravated or simple.  Rape, attempted rape, and sexual 
assaults are excluded from this category, as well as robbery and attempted 
robbery.  The severity of assaults ranges from minor threat to incidents 
which are nearly fatal.58   
Homicides are further classified as murders:   
The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program defines murder and 
nonnegligent manslaughter as the willful (nonnegligent) killing of one 
human being by another.  The classification of this offense is based solely 
on police investigation as opposed to the determination of a court, medical 
examiner, coroner, jury, or other judicial body.  The UCR Program does 
                                                 
57 United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Criminal Victimization in the 




not include the following situations in this offense classification:  deaths 
caused by negligence, suicide, or accident; justifiable homicides; and 
attempts to murder or assaults to murder, which are scored as aggravated 
assaults.59   
Robberies are defined by the USDOJ as “[t]he taking or attempting to take 
anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or 
threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear.”60  Figure 3 depicts the 
total number of assaults, robberies, and homicides in Salinas since 1980 and the 
corresponding change in population.  Figure 4 combines these two variables to show per 
capita violence over time at a rate of 1:1,000. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Violent incidents and population in Salinas from 1980 to 200861 
 
 
                                                 
59 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Report:  Crime in the United States, 2006,” 
September 2007, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/documents/murdermain.pdf. 
60 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook,” 2004, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/handbook/ucrhandbook04.pdf, 21. 
61 Violence data for 1980-2007 from United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/Local/JurisbyJuris.cfm.  Violence data for 2008 from 




Figure 4.   Salinas Violence Rate Per Capita (1:1,000)62 
2.   Independent Variables 
In order to determine specific environmental factors that affect violence in 
Salinas, the authors postulate nine broad categories (independent variables, or IVs) for 
analysis.  These IVs include:  Economy; Population; Housing Density; Education; Police 
Force; Prison Influence; Gang Rivalry; Social Service Programs; and Community 
Involvement.  Each IV is further broken down into smaller sub-categories (indicators) for 
analysis.  For example, the indicators for the economy IV include Salinas’ spending 
budget, retail sales, unemployment rate, and average income level, among others.  There 
are several hypotheses on how each IV affects violence, listed in the next section.  Each 
variable was normalized to a per capita rate of 1:1,000 in order to show consistency over 
time and compare to the per capita violence rate.  Monetary rates were not normalized 
against inflation due to a lack of data and time.     
3. Statistical Analysis 
After determining the large cross-section of possible environmental factors, the 
authors collected data for as many IVs as possible.  For the IVs and indicators with 
                                                 
62 Data from Figure 3 converted into a per capita violence rate of 1:1,000. 
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numerical data, the statistics were compared to the violence rate to determine 
correlations.  Unfortunately, numerical statistics were not available for each indicator, or 
even overall IVs, in some cases.  For these indicators and IVs, the factors are discussed 
but no statistical analysis is offered.   
Four tests were conducted to determine the validity of each hypothesis.  The first 
test graphically compared each indicator against violence in a year-by-year graphic line 
comparison, but the variables were not correlated.  These graphs show trends over the 
years, and if the indicators and violence moved together or in opposition to each other. 
The second test compared the change (delta) of each indicator from one year to 
the next with the change in the violence rate in the same time frame.  The deltas were 
calculated for each year of available data, then plotted against each other on an X-Y 
scatterplot.  For example, for the hypothesis, “If the unemployment rate increases, 
violence increases,” one would expect to see most of the scatterplot points in the 
negative-negative or positive-positive quadrants.  This would indicate that when the 
unemployment rate increases or decreases, violence respectively increases or decreases.  
A preponderance of points in either of the positive-negative quadrants would serve to 
disprove the hypothesis because the unemployment and violence rates are moving in 
opposition to each other.  All scatterplots are displayed in Appendix A.   
The third test involved running a linear regression between each indicator and 
violence to determine the correlation coefficient.  The correlation coefficient showed 
whether the relationship between the indicator and violence was positive or negative, and 
also if the relationship was negligible, weak, or strong.  In a positive relationship, if the 
indicator increases or decreases, violence respectively increases or decreases.  In a 
negative relationship, if the indicator increases or decreases, violence respectively 
decreases or increases.  Correlation coefficients measure the degree to which two 
variables are linearly related and vary between -1 and +1.  A value of 1 indicates a perfect 
linear relationship, and the positive or negative symbol indicates if the correlation is 
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positive or negative.  A value of 0 indicates there is no linear relationship between the 
variables.63  All correlation coefficients are listed in Appendix C, Table 3. 
The fourth and final test involved conducting a time-series regression.  This 
process had two steps.  The first step determined if any indicators within each IV were 
correlated with each other.  Positive coefficients are interpreted as contributing factors to 
the level of violence.  Negative coefficients are interpreted as a deterrent to the level of 
violence.  If any of the indicators within an IV were correlated, then only one of these 
indicators was used to represent the entire IV.  If none of the indicators were correlated, 
then each indicator was compared separately against violence.  For instance, the 
economic IV compared the indicators of unemployment, city budget, and retail sales.  
The city budget and retail sales were highly correlated.  This allowed the use of the 
Salinas city budget to represent the economic IV.  However, unemployment was not 
correlated therefore it was separated into another category.   
The second step of the time-series regression involved conducting a Durbin-
Watson static time-series analysis of all the data for each represented IV against violence. 
The basic goal of the static model was to identify whether or not the IVs were deterring 
or attributing to the level of violence.  The Durbin-Watson statistic analysis detected 
potential serial correlation within the IVs.  Then, to minimize any inferential problems 
stemming from the serial correlation, a Cochrane-Orcutt dynamic model was used.  In 
both models a negative coefficient indicates that violence is being deterred.  A second 
number, the P-Value, indicates if the variable will show the same affect over time.   
P-Values less than .05 indicate that the observed results are consistent over time and 
cannot be attributed to mere chance.64  The coefficients, P-Values, and Durbin-Watson 
statistics are listed in Appendix B, Table 2. 
These tests helped determine the validity of each hypothesis.  In order to 
determine whether each hypothesis was confirmed, refuted or inconclusive, the authors 
                                                 
63 Valerie J. Easton and John H. McColl, “Statistics Glossary: Paired Data, Correlation, & 
Regression,” http://www.stats.gla.ac.uk/steps/glossary/paired_data.html#corrcoeff. 
64 See Appendix B for further information and definitions regarding the time-series regression, and 
Durbin-Watson and Cochrane-Orcutt models and analysis. 
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used the following correlation scale:  if the data showed 0 to 35 percent correlation by 
either the indicator delta test or the linear regression, the hypothesis was determined 
false, or refuted; if the data was 36 to 65 percent correlated, the hypothesis determined as 
inconclusive, as the data was too random to accurately determine the casual effects of 
violence and the tested indicator and/or IV; if the data was higher than 66 percent 
correlated, then the hypothesis was determined confirmed.  The time-series regression 
results also backed up the confirmation, inconclusiveness, or refutation of each 
hypothesis.         
E. HYPOTHESES 
All of the proposed hypotheses for this study are listed below.  All variables, 
including violence, refer to per capita rates.  The hypotheses will be further discussed and 
analyzed in Section II. 
1.   Economy 
Hypothesis 1a:  If the spending budget of Salinas decreases, violence increases.  
Hypothesis 1b:  If retail sales decrease, violence increases. 
Hypothesis 1c:  If the unemployment rate increases, violence increases.  
Hypothesis 1d:  If the agricultural industry decreases, violence increases.   
Hypothesis 1e:  If the percentage of people below the poverty line increases, 
violence increases.  
Hypothesis 1f:  If average income decreases, violence increases.   
Hypothesis 1g:  If the cost of living index increases, violence increases.   
2.   Population 
Hypothesis 2a:  If the percentage of single parents increases, especially single 
mothers, violence increases.  
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Hypothesis 2b:  If there is a higher population of males versus females, violence 
increases.  
Hypothesis 2c:  If the majority of the population is 29 and under, violence 
increases.  
3. Housing 
Hypothesis 3a:  If the housing market increases, violence increases.  
Hypothesis 3b:  If the average number of persons per household increases, 
violence increases. 
Hypothesis 3c:  If the amount of vacant units increases, violence increases. 
Hypothesis 3d:  If housing units per capita decreases, violence increases. 
4. Education 
Hypothesis 4a:  If the dropout rate increases, violence increases.  
Hypothesis 4b:  If the graduation rate decreases, violence increases.  
Hypothesis 4c:  If the average daily attendance decreases, violence increases.  
Hypothesis 4d:  If the school budget per student decreases, violence increases. 
Hypothesis 4e:  If education levels decrease, violence increases.   
Hypothesis 4f:  If the amount of school programs offered decreases, violence 
increases.  
5. Police Force 
Hypothesis 5a:  If the Salinas PD budget decreases, violence increases. 
Hypothesis 5b:  If the number of Salinas PD employees decreases, violence 
increases. 
Hypothesis 5c:  If the number of Salinas PD active patrols decreases, violence 
increases.   
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6. Gang Rivalry 
Hypothesis 6a:  If the number of rival gangs increases, violence increases.   
Hypothesis 6b:  If the number of gang cliques increases, violence increases.  
7. Prison 
Hypothesis 7a:  If prison rehabilitation programs decrease, violence increases.  
Hypothesis 7b:  If the prison recidivism rate increases, violence increases.  
8. Social Service Programs 
Hypothesis 8a:  If social welfare decreases, violence increases. 
Hypothesis 8b:  If the number of social workers decreases, violence increases.    
Hypothesis 8c:  If the number of non-school programs decreases, violence 
increases.  
9. Community Involvement 
Hypothesis 9a:  If the number of neighborhood watch programs decreases, 
violence increases.  
Hypothesis 9b:  If the number of Priority One police calls decreases, violence 
increases.   
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II. DATA ANALYSIS 
The data and analysis presented in this thesis are specific to Salinas, California.  
Therefore, the conclusions about the affects of environmental factors on violence are also 
specific to Salinas.  Analyzing another community under the same conditions may result 
in different findings. 
A. ECONOMY 
Economy is defined as “the management of the resources of a community.”65  
There are several areas that affect the economy, but for the purpose of this analysis the 
indicators for this IV are:  the spending budget of the city of Salinas; retail sales; the 
unemployment rate; the agricultural industry; poverty; average income; and the cost of 
living.  Data was only available for the spending budget, retail sales, and the 
unemployment rate.  The other indicators are discussed but no statistical analysis is 
offered. 
Hypothesis 1a:  If the spending budget of Salinas decreases, violence increases.  
The justification behind this hypothesis is that without adequate city funding, appropriate 
measures to instill peace will be eliminated.  This includes not only law enforcement, but 
also other agencies that give back to the community and help keep the city a clean and 
safe environment, such as fire departments, parks and recreation, library services, and the 
department of public works.  The numbers used are the actual spending budgets of 
Salinas per capita.   
The result of this hypothesis is inconclusive.  When looking at the indicator 
deltas, there is a 42 percent opposition between the city budget and violence.66  This 
means 42 percent of the time if the budget decreased or increased, violence respectively 
increased or decreased.  Figure 5 shows a 25-year comparison of violence and the Salinas  
 
                                                 
65 Dictionary.com, “Economy,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/economy. 
66 See Appendix A, Figure 24. 
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budget.  When utilizing the time-series regression, the results are also inconclusive.  The 
deterrence level of the coefficient is positive, but essentially at zero, and the P-value is 
.053, indicating inaccuracy over time.67   
 
 
Figure 5.   Salinas Budget vs. Violence Rate68 
Hypothesis 1b:  If retail sales decrease, violence increases.  Retail sales can be 
both a cause of violence and an indicator of violence.  As a cause of violence, a decline in 
retail sales could be the result of a downturn in the overall economy.  If people do not 
have the means for basic life needs, they could resort to violence for survival.  Lower 
retail sales may also be an indicator of violence, because when a city is violent, people 
may be more likely to avoid that city for safety reasons.  A decline in retail sales could 
indicate that patrons do not feel safe shopping in Salinas, even if the economy is healthy.    
The result of this hypothesis is inconclusive.  When looking at the indicator 
deltas, there is a 37 percent opposition between Salinas’ retail sales and violence rate.69  
This means 37 percent of the time if the retail sales increased or decreased, violence 
                                                 
67 See Appendix B, Table 2. 
68 Salinas budget data from the Salinas Department of Finance annual reports.   
69 See Appendix A, Figure 25. 
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respectively decreased or increased.  Figure 6 shows a 27-year comparison of violence 
and the city’s retail sales.  Running a linear regression confirms that retail sales and 
violence move in opposition to each other, but the -.204 correlation coefficient is weak.70   
    
 
Figure 6.   Retail Sales vs. Violence Rate71 
Hypothesis 1c:  If the unemployment rate increases, violence increases.  The 
justification behind this hypothesis is if unemployment is high, the perceived opportunity 
costs of engaging in illegal activity are lower.  In a 2001 study that controlled for 
demographic and economic variables, researchers found that unemployment had a strong 
correlation with property crime rates.  However, for violent crime, unemployment 
exhibited a weak positive correlation with robbery and assault, but a negative correlation 
with homicides and rapes.72 
                                                 
70 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
71 Retail sales data from the Salinas Department of Finance annual reports.     
72 Steven Raphael and Rudolph Winter-Ebmer, “Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime,” 
Journal of Law and Economics 44 (2001): 261. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/725653.pdf. 
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This hypothesis is confirmed.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 67 
percent similarity between the unemployment rate in Salinas and violence.73  This means 
67 percent of the time, if the unemployment rate increased or decreased, violence 
respectively increased or decreased.  Figure 7 shows a 17-year comparison of violence 
and the city’s unemployment rate.  When utilizing the time-series regression, the data 
also shows a confirmed hypothesis.  The coefficient is positive and the P-value is .012, 
indicating accuracy over time.74 
 
 
Figure 7.   Unemployment Rate vs. Violence Rate75 
Although the overall focus of this thesis is on violence per capita, it is relevant to 
test if the unemployment rate also affects the number of homicides in Salinas.  When 
looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 72 percent similarity between the unemployment 
and homicide rates.76  This means 72 percent of the time if the unemployment rate 
increased or decreased, homicides respectively increased or decreased.  Figure 8 shows 
                                                 
73 See Appendix A, Figure 26. 
74 See Appendix B, Table 2. 
75 Unemployment rate data retrieved from http://www.economagic.com/em-
cgi/data.exe/blsla/lauMT06415003.   
76 See Appendix A, Figure 27. 
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an 18-year comparison of homicide and unemployment.  Running a linear regression, the 
correlation coefficient for the homicide and unemployment rates is .559.77 
 
 
Figure 8.   Unemployment Rate vs. Homicide Rate78 
Other areas of the economy that may impact violence in Salinas are the 
agricultural industry; the percentage of the population living under the poverty line; 
average household income; and the cost of living index.  However, the data was either 
insufficient or nonexistent to adequately confirm or deny these hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1d:  If the agricultural industry decreases, violence increases.  The 
justification behind this hypothesis is if the agricultural industry decreases, it will require 
fewer workers to harvest crops.  The agricultural industry is one of the largest employers 
in Salinas and affects a significant portion of the local population and economy.  A 
decrease in the agricultural industry could translate to a higher unemployment rate and 
lower average household income for Salinas.     
Crop reports were available for Monterey County, but they did not delineate 
Salinas’ contributions each year.  Although the authors could analyze the county as a 
                                                 
77 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
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whole with respect to the crop reports and county violence rate, the results would not be 
specific to Salinas.  Therefore this hypothesis is inconclusive until agricultural figures are 
available solely for Salinas.  
Hypothesis 1e:  If the percentage of people below the poverty line increases, 
violence increases.  Hypothesis 1f:  If average income decreases, violence increases.  
Hypothesis 1g:  If the cost of living index increases, violence increases.  The 
justifications for Hypotheses 1e, 1f, and 1g are similar.  “There is a growing consensus 
that resource deprivation in general is an underlying cause of violent crime and that 
resource deprivation is especially associated with assault and homicide.”79  If people do 
not have the monetary means for basic survival needs, the perceived opportunity costs of 
engaging in illegal activity are lower.   
The only data found for Hypotheses 1e and 1f were from the United States Census 
Reports from 1980, 1990, and 2000.  Three data sets do not provide enough information 
to accurately analyze trends or correlations.  The only data found for Hypothesis 1g 
showed Salinas had a cost of living index of 115 percent in 2008.80  Because the datasets 
for these hypotheses are too small for meaningful statistical analysis, these hypotheses 
are inconclusive.       
Based on the data the authors were able to obtain, the unemployment rate is the 
only indicator in the Economy IV that shows a measurable affect on violence.  There are 
several other areas open for further study if the data becomes available, but as of this 
writing Salinas should focus on lowering the unemployment rate to help lower overall 
violence rates. 
                                                                                                                                                 
78 Unemployment rate data retrieved from http://www.economagic.com/em-
cgi/data.exe/blsla/lauMT06415003.   
79 Ching-Chi Hsieh and M.D. Pugh, “Poverty, Income Inequality, and Violent Crime: A Meta-
Analysis of Recent Aggregate Data Studies,” Criminal Justice Review 18 (1993): 182, 
http://cjr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/18/2/182. 
80 City-Data.com, “Salinas, California,” http://www.city-data.com/city/Salinas-California.html. 2008 
Salinas Cost of Living Index: 115.5.  
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B. POPULATION 
Population refers to the number of individuals living in a given geographical 
space.  For the purpose of this study, the geographical space is the city of Salinas.   
As a primarily agricultural community, Salinas is made up of legal residents, migrant 
workers, and illegal immigrants.  However, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of 
migrant workers and illegal immigrants living in Salinas.  Also, as stated earlier, the 
census report is only published every ten years.  Therefore, the residential data reported 
to the California Department of Finance was used to account for the population of Salinas 
in the intervening years.  The population in this study was normalized at a ratio of 
1:1,000.  This allowed comparison of Salinas to other cities and states, and to the 
different data sets.          
In an environment where social factors do not affect outcomes, every variable 
should change at a rate proportional to population changes.  In other words, as the 
population grows, violence should grow at a rate equal to the rate of population growth, 
creating a constant violence per capita rate.  However, this is not the case.  As evidenced 
in Figure 3, the population and violence in Salinas have not changed in accordance with 
each other.  This is further exemplified in Figure 4, which would be a straight line if the 
population and violence changed proportionally.   
When looking at the raw population and raw violence in Salinas, there is a 68 
percent similarity between the Salinas population and violence.81  This means 68 percent 
of the time when the population increased or decreased, violence respectively increased 
or decreased.  Comparing raw population and raw violence utilizing the time-series 
regression, the coefficient is positive and the P-value is .001, showing accuracy over 
time.82  Breaking the timeframe into two distinct segments and running linear 
regressions, from 1980 to 1994 the correlation coefficient for the population and violence 
is .883, but from 1995 to 2008 it is -.927.83  This is due to the fact that from 1980 to 1994 
                                                 
81 See Appendix A, Figure 28. 
82 See Appendix B, Table 2. 
83 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
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violence increased as the population increased, and then from 1995 to 2008 violence 
decreased even though the population continued to increase (see Figure 3).  The overall 
correlation coefficient from 1980 to 2008 is -.012, indicating a negligible negative 
relationship between the population and violence during that timeframe.84 
There are three areas within the population that may impact violence:  the number 
of single parents; the ratio of males to females; and the percentage of the population 
under age 29.  However, the only data found for these indicators are from the United 
States Census Reports from 1980, 1990, and 2000.  Three data sets do not provide 
enough information to accurately analyze trends or correlations, but the justifications for 
these hypotheses are detailed below.     
Hypothesis 2a:  If the percentage of single parents increases, especially single 
mothers, violence increases.  The justification for this hypothesis is from research which 
finds positive correlations between single-parent homes and youth delinquency.  
“Adolescents living in ecological contexts characterized by more one-parent families 
show more delinquent behavior than adolescents living in ecological contexts in which 
there are fewer one-parent families.”85   
Although the three datasets in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census Reports do not 
provide a robust enough sample for analysis, a proxy comparison shows support for this 
hypothesis.  Figure 9 depicts the census tracts in Salinas with respect to the number of 
shootings and the percentage of single-mother households.  Each point on Figure 10 
represents the number of shootings from January 2008 to August 2009 correlated with the 
percentage of female-headed households for each census tract.  Referencing the trendline, 
a positive relationship exists between the indicators:  the census tracts with a higher 
percentage of female head of households had a higher number of shootings.86   
                                                 
84 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
85 Gijs Weijters, Peer Scheepers, and Jan Gerris, “City and/or Neighbourhood Determinants? Studying 
Contextual Effects on Youth Delinquency,” European Journal of Criminology 6 (2009): 451, 
http://euc.sagepub.com. 
86 Trendline equation:  y = 2.1146x – 12.976. 
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Although the trendline for Figure 9 exhibits a positive relationship, it is important 
to note that the data only covers 20 months.  Analyzing the same data over a period of 
years or even decades could significantly alter the results.  Additionally, the data for the 
female head of households came from the 2000 Census Report, which may not be valid 
for 2008 and 2009.  Finally, single-parent households can be representative of other 
environmental and social factors that affect violence levels, such as economic status, 
unemployment, and the high school drop-out rate.  It may not be sufficient to look at 
single-parent households in a vacuum without considering other socio-economic factors 
that are typically associated with these households. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Shootings and Single-Mother Households by Census Tract in Salinas87 
Hypothesis 2b:  If there is a higher population of males versus females, violence 
increases.  The justification for this hypothesis is based on research which indicates that 
males commit more violent offenses than females during adolescence and into adulthood.  
One study showed that at age 12, violent offenses committed by males outnumbered 
those committed by females at a rate of 2:1.  By age 18 this ratio increased to 3:1, and by 
                                                 
87 Chart created October 23, 2009 by NPS Department of Defense Analysis Research Assistant 
Rebecca Lorentz using Salinas Police Department Crime Reports and the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2000 
Census data.  Ms. Lorentz gave express approval to the authors to reproduce her chart in this thesis. 
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age 21, the ratio increased again to 4:1.88  For further research on this hypothesis, a 
potential proxy comparison could include the gender comparison in Salinas’ primary and 
secondary schools.  Although not inclusive of the entire population of Salinas, a 
comparison of the percentage of school-age males to violence could determine if there is 
at least a partial correlation between the two variables. 
Hypothesis 2d:  If the majority of the population is 29 and under, violence 
increases.  Similar to the previous population-related hypotheses, the justification for this 
hypothesis is research-based:   
The successful transition into adult roles (work, marriage, parenting) 
appears to reduce involvement in violent behavior.  In one national study, 
nearly 80 percent of adolescents who were serious violent offenders 
reported no serious violent offenses during their adult years (to age 30).89   
The California Department of Finance Web site contains breakdowns of age and 
race demographics by county for the years 1970 to 2007, but the statistics are not further 
broken down by city.90  A proxy comparison could be used for the whole of Monterey 
County, but the results would not be specific to Salinas.   
The Population IV requires further research when datasets become available to 
determine if the indicators listed here affect violence levels in Salinas. 
C. HOUSING 
Adequate housing is one of life’s basic needs and provides much more than mere 
shelter: 
Housing fulfills physical needs by providing security and shelter from 
weather and climate.  It fulfills psychological needs by providing a sense 
of personal space and privacy.  It fulfills social needs by providing a  
 
 
                                                 
88 Delbert S. Elliott, “Serious Violent Offenders: Onset, Developmental Course, and Termination,” 
Criminology 32 (1994), http://www.proquest.com/. 
89 Delbert S. Elliott, “Youth Violence: An Overview,” March 1994, 6. 
http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/publications/papers/CSPV-008.pdf. 
90 California Dept. of Finance, http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/data/. 
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gathering area and communal space for the human family, the basic unit of 
society.  In many societies, it also fulfills economic needs by functioning 
as a center for commercial production.91 
To study this independent variable, the indicators include the value of the housing 
market, the average persons per household, the number of vacant housing units, and the 
number of housing units per capita.  The vacant housing units and the occupied housing 
units are represented using a per capita rate of 1:1,000 residents.  
Hypothesis 3a:  If the housing market increases, violence increases.  The 
justification for this hypothesis is that if the average home or rental price increases at a 
rate faster than income levels, low- and even middle-income populations could be 
completely priced out of the market.  Although higher home prices and rents are usually 
associated with periods of economic expansion, they are not necessarily positive 
indicators for society if incomes and wages do not increase as well.  This was the case in 
Salinas in the 2000s.   
As previously mentioned, the economic boom in the late 1990s and mid-2000s led 
to skyrocketing home prices in California, including Salinas.  The median home price in 
Salinas in 2000 was $245,377; by 2007 this figure soared to $531,170.92  In the same 
time frame, the median household income in Salinas went from $43,720 to $52,560.93  
Therefore, the median home price increased 216 percent, but the median household 
income only increased 20 percent.  Many families were priced out of the housing market 
and either had to rent inadequate spaces or share quarters with other families instead.  
Similar to the previous arguments regarding the economy, if people are unable to afford 
the basic needs of life, such as housing, they may be more likely to resort to violence.   
This hypothesis is refuted, with respect to the relationship between the housing 
market and violence.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 44 percent 
                                                 
91 Human Rights Education Associates, “The Right to Housing,” 
http://www.hrea.org/index.php?base_id=149. 
92 Monterey County Association of Realtors, “Monterey County Stats,” 
http://www.mcar.com/HomesearchConsumerinfo.html. 
93 City-Data.com, “Salinas, California,” http://www.city-data.com/city/Salinas-California.html. 
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similarity between the Salinas housing market and violence.94  This means 44 percent of 
the time when the Salinas housing market increased or decreased, violence respectively 
increased or decreased.  Figure 10 shows a 10-year comparison of violence and the 
Salinas housing market.  When running a linear regression, the correlation coefficient of 
the Salinas housing market and violence is -.567.95  This indicates that the housing 
market moves in opposition to violence, which refutes the hypothesis.  However, there is 
not enough correlation from either the indicator deltas or the linear regression to confirm 
that the housing market itself affects violence. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Average Housing Prices vs. Violence Rate96 
To further analyze this hypothesis, the housing market was also compared to 
homicides.  This resulted in a stronger correlation, with a 78 percent opposition between 
the housing market and homicides rates.97  Therefore, 78 percent of the time when the 
housing market increased or decreased, homicides respectively decreased or increased.  
Figure 11 shows a 10-year comparison of homicides and the Salinas housing market.  
                                                 
94 See Appendix A, Figure 29. 
95 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
96 Average housing price data from Monterey County Association of Realtors, 
http://www.mcar.com/HomesearchConsumerinfo.html. 
97 See Appendix A, Figure 30. 
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When running a linear regression, the correlation coefficient for homicides and the 
Salinas housing market is -.692.98  This indicates that the housing market also moves in 
opposition with homicides, which further refutes the positive relationship postulated for 
the housing market and violence. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Average Housing Prices vs. Homicide Rate99 
Hypothesis 3b:  If the average number of persons per household increases, 
violence increases.  There are arguments that too many people in a single housing unit 
results in violence due to a lack of individual attention, which causes people to seek 
attention and mentorship elsewhere.  This outside attention could involve criminal 
activity to impress peers or earn acceptance into a gang.  There are also arguments that 
more people in a single housing unit results in less violence, due to family involvement 
and a fear of disappointing the family.100  The authors believe that the former is true for 
                                                 
98 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
99 Average housing price data from Monterey County Association of Realtors, 
http://www.mcar.com/HomesearchConsumerinfo.html. 
100 Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social 
Movements,” in Social Movements and Networks: Rational Approaches to Collective Action, edited by 
Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2003), 282–283. 
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Salinas because of its high population turnover rates and ethnic diversity.101  Salinas is an 
agricultural community with a large migrant population during the growing and 
harvesting seasons.  While the adults are working in the fields, the children are often left 
unsupervised.  Although a majority of Salinas is Hispanic, there are tensions between the 
settled Mexican-Americans and the migrants.  Migrant children are often labeled as 
Sureños and subsequently targeted by Norteños.102    
However, the data shows the positive correlation hypothesis is refuted, and a 
negative correlation hypothesis is confirmed.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there 
is only a 33 percent similarity between the average persons per household (APPH) and 
violence.103  This means 33 percent of the time if the APPH increased or decreased, 
violence respectively increased or decreased.  Conversely, 67 percent of the time if the 
APPH increased or decreased, violence respectively decreased or increased.  Figure 12 
shows an 18-year comparison of violence and APPH.  Running a linear regression also 
indicates that the positive correlation APPH hypothesis is false and the negative 
correlation APPH is confirmed.  The correlation coefficient is -.813, indicating that when 
APPH increases, violence decreases.104  The overall takeaway is that the average persons 




                                                 
101 D. Wayne Osgood and Jeff M. Chambers, “Community Correlates of Rural Youth Violence,” 
OJJDP: Juvenile Justice Bulletin, May 2003, http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/193591/contents.html. 
102 Stahl, “Saving Salinas.”  
103 See Appendix A, Figure 31. 
104 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
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Figure 12.   Average Persons Per Household vs. Violence Rate105 
Hypothesis 3c:  If the amount of vacant units increases, violence increases.  The 
justification for this hypothesis is that vacant units provide convenient and accessible 
locations for criminals to meet, plan operations, and conduct business.  A study in Austin, 
Texas found that the crime rates on blocks with vacant buildings were twice as high as 
blocks without vacant buildings.106   
This hypothesis is confirmed.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 67 
percent similarity between the amount of vacant units and violence.107  This means 67 
percent of the time when the amount of vacant units in Salinas increased or decreased, 
violence respectively increased or decreased.  Figure 13 shows a 19-year comparison of 
violence and vacant units per 1,000 residents.   Running a linear regression also confirms 
that vacant units are a key environmental factor in violence, with a correlation coefficient 
of .791.108 
                                                 
105 Persons per household data from the California Department of Finance Web site, 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/. 
106 William Spelman, “Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for Crime?” Journal of Criminal Justice 21 
(1993): 481. 
107 See Appendix A, Figure 32. 
108 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
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Figure 13.   Vacant Housing Units vs. Violence Rate109 
Hypothesis 3d:  If housing units per capita decreases, violence increases.  When 
there are fewer housing units available and the population of a city continues to grow, the 
population becomes denser.  Studies have shown that when a population is denser, 
violence increases.110  This is caused by higher interaction between individuals coupled 
with other socio-economic frustrations.   
This hypothesis is confirmed with respect to housing units per capita affecting 
violence, but the relationship is actually positive, not negative as proposed.  When 
looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 33 percent opposition rate between the number 
of housing units per capita and violence.111  This means 33 percent of the time when the 
number of housing units per capita in Salinas increased or decreased, violence 
respectively decreased or increased.  This also means that 67 percent of the time when 
housing units per capita increased or decreased, violence respectively increased or 
decreased, indicating a parallel relationship between housing units per capita and 
                                                 
109 Vacant housing unit data from the California Department of Finance Web site, 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/. 
110 Paul E. Joubert and Craig J. Forsyth, “A Macro View of Two Decades of Violence in America,” 
American Journal of Criminal Justice XIII (1988): 12. 
111 See Appendix A, Figure 33. 
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violence.  Figure 14 shows a 19-year comparison of violence and housing units per 1,000 
residents.  When utilizing the time-series regression, the data shows a positive coefficient 
and a P-value of .001, indicating that more housing units contributes to violence.112  
Running a linear regression also confirms that housing units and violence are in concert 
with each other with a .795 correlation coefficient.113 
   
 
Figure 14.   Housing Units vs. Violence114 
For the Housing IV, the data for average persons per household, vacant units, and 
housing units shows that the denser per capita the city of Salinas is, the less violence 
occurs.  One explanation for this is that families hold each other accountable for their 
actions.  Households with a higher number of residents may need each other to survive.  
If one individual is taken out of the household, then the income and services provided by 
that individual is lost.  The remaining family members or residents will have to either 
suffer the loss of income or services, or work harder to make up for the loss.  Although 
less violence caused by denser populations and households may not happen in every 
                                                 
112 See Appendix B, Table 2. 
113 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
114 Housing unit data from the California Department of Finance Web site, http://www.dof.ca.gov/. 
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community, it is exhibited in Salinas.  Further research in this area could include 
analyzing the same variables either by census tract or by Salinas Police Department Area 
Commands.115 
D. EDUCATION 
Four areas were researched to determine the affects of education on violence in 
Salinas:  dropout rates, graduation rates, average daily attendance (ADA), and school 
budgets.  To simplify the budget, the amount of money that the school receives per 
student was used.  A key note of importance is the difficulty in showing or projecting 
time lags, which ultimately affect the data results.  A time lag in educational hypotheses 
refers to the amount of time it takes a student who drops out of school to commit a 
violent act or crime.  The data presented in this thesis are on a year-to-year basis, but it is 
conceivable that a dropout will not commit a crime in the same calendar year as leaving 
school, if at all.  Therefore, the results listed below could be skewed because it is nearly 
impossible to account for time lags in the data.   
Salinas is broken down into four school districts that progress into the fifth school 
district, the Salinas Unified High School District (SUHSD).  There are 30 elementary 
schools, six middle schools and five high schools.  With the large number of schools and 
students the focus for this research was the SUHSD.  One reason is the data retrieved to 
support the findings of the hypotheses came from the SUHSD, and the other reason is 
that violence is more likely to come from high school students as opposed to middle 
school or elementary school students.  In June 2009, California’s juvenile detention 
centers held 754 children between the ages of 15 and 18, but only 19 children aged 14 
and under.116  Although not representative of the entire school-aged population in 
Salinas, using just the data from the SUHSD should suffice to analyze the hypotheses.  
                                                 
115 For Salinas Police Department Area Commands, see 
http://www.ci.salinas.ca.us/maps/pdf/PoliceAreaCommand.pdf. 
116 California Department of Corrections And Rehabilitation Division of Juvenile Justice, “Population 
Overview as of June 30, 2009,” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/docs/research/POPOVER-
JUNE%202009.pdf. 
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The justification for Hypotheses 4a and 4b, which analyze the high school 
dropout rate and graduation rate, respectively, is based on the expectation that a high 
school diploma leads to increased earning opportunities and education.   
There are many theoretical reasons to expect that education reduces crime.  
By raising earnings, education raises the opportunity cost of crime and the 
cost of time spent in prison.  Education may also make individuals less 
impatient or more risk adverse, further reducing the propensity to commit 
crimes.117   
In one study, researchers found that, “a 1-percent increase in the high school completion 
rate of all men ages 20-60 would save the United States as much as $1.4 billion per year 
in reduced costs from crime incurred by victims and society at large.”118 
Hypothesis 4a:  If the dropout rate increases, violence increases.  This 
hypothesis is confirmed.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 69 percent 
similarity between high school dropout rates and violence.119  This means 69 percent of 
the time when the dropout rate increased or decreased, violence respectively increased or 
decreased.  Figure 15 shows a 17-year comparison of violence and the SUHSD dropout 
rate.  When utilizing the time-series regression the data also shows a confirmed 
hypothesis.  The coefficient is positive showing no deterrence to violence when there are 
higher dropout rates.  Conversely, this indicates that when there are fewer dropouts, 
violence is deterred.  However the P-value is .405, showing inaccuracy over time.120  The 
takeaway is that lowering high school dropout rates should reduce the overall violence 
rate in Salinas. 
 
                                                 
117 Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, “The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison 
Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports,” The American Economic Review 94 (March 2004): 183. 
118 Ibid., 183–184. 
119 See Appendix A, Figure 34. 
120 See Appendix B, Table 2. 
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Figure 15.   High School Dropout Rate vs. Violence Rate121 
Hypothesis 4b:  If the graduation rate decreases, violence increases.  The result 
of this hypothesis is confirmed.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 63 
percent opposition between high school graduation rates and violence.122  This means 63 
percent of the time when the high school graduation rate increased or decreased, violence 
respectively decreased or increased.  Figure 16 shows a 9-year comparison of violence 
and the SUHSD graduation rate.  A linear regression shows a strong negative relationship 
between violence and the HS graduation rate with a correlation coefficient of -.759.123 
 
                                                 
121 Data from the California Department of Education Dataquest Web site, 
http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/. 
122 See Appendix A, Figure 35. 
123 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
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Figure 16.   High School Graduation Rate vs. Violence Rate124 
Hypothesis 4c:  If the average daily attendance decreases, violence increases. 
The justification for this hypothesis is that outside of school, there is more opportunity 
for youths to participate in activities related to violence.  In school, students are in a 
controlled environment under the watchful eyes of teachers, faculty, and peers; outside of 
school they are typically unsupervised and left to their own devices.   
This hypothesis is confirmed.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 67 
percent opposition between high school average daily attendance and violence.125  This 
means 67 percent of the time when the high school ADA rate increased or decreased, 
violence respectively decreased or increased.  Figure 17 shows a 16-year comparison of 
violence and the SUHSD ADA rate.  A linear regression shows a negative relationship 
between violence and ADA with a -.472 correlation coefficient.126   
 
                                                 
124 Data from the California Department of Education Dataquest Web site, 
http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/. 
125 See Appendix A, Figure 36. 
126 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
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Figure 17.   High School Average Daily Attendance Rate vs. Violence Rate127 
Hypothesis 4d:  If the school budget per student decreases, violence increases.  
The school budget in Salinas, similar to all school districts in California, is primarily 
based off the average daily attendance numbers.  If the school is allocated $1,000 per 
enrolled student, but only has an ADA of 90 percent, then the school will only get 90 
percent, or $900 per student.  School districts lose millions of dollars a year when 
students do not show up for class.  In 2008 the combined school districts that serve 
Salinas lost an estimated $5.2 million dollars.128  This money could be spent on 
additional teachers, educational programs, tutoring programs, gang intervention, and 
prevention programs.  A small additional budget amount, approximately $150 per 
student, is supplied by the California Lottery.129   
This hypothesis is confirmed.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 60 
percent opposition between SUHSD budget and violence.130  This means 60 percent of 
                                                 
127 Data from the Education Data Partnership Web site, http://www.ed-data.k12.ca.us/welcome.asp. 
128 Ibid.  Figure represents the difference between what the school district was allocated at the 
beginning of 2007 school year and what they actually received after the 2007-2008 school year completion, 
based on ADA. 
129 EdSource, “The Basics of California’s School Finance System,” January 2009, 
http://www.edsource.org/pub_QA_FinanceSyst06.html, 1. 
130 See Appendix A, Figure 37. 
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the time when money per student increased or decreased, violence respectively decreased 
or increased.  Figure 18 shows a 16-year comparison of violence and the SUHSD amount 
per student.  Although the indicator delta test is lower than the 67 percent threshold for 
confirmation, the linear regression correlation coefficient is a very strong -.849.131  With 
the combination of these two tests, the authors feel the results are robust enough to 
consider the hypothesis confirmed. 
 
 
Figure 18.   High School Budget Per Student vs. Violence Rate132 
There are two other hypotheses that may impact violence.  However there was 
insufficient data to confirm the hypotheses.   
Hypothesis 4e:  If education levels decrease, violence increases.  The 
justification for this hypothesis is in accordance with the justification given for 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b:  education raises earnings, which lowers the appeal of committing 
crimes for monetary gain. 
Hypothesis 4f:  If the amount of school programs offered decreases, violence 
increases.  School programs offer different alternatives to gang life.  The programs can 
                                                 
131 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
132 Data from the Education Data Partnership Web site, http://www.ed-data.k12.ca.us/welcome.asp. 
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be anything from vocational education programs to after-school tutoring or mentoring 
programs.  The vocational programs tie in with higher education levels.  Individuals who 
have difficulties with conceptual learning may be more successful with technical 
learning, especially students who do not speak English as their first language.  
The statistical findings for the Education IV confirm that education deters 
violence in Salinas.  Keeping children in school through graduation not only raises the 
attendance and graduation rates, but in turn lowers the dropout rates and increases the 
school budgets.  It cannot be overstated how important this environmental factor is to 
affecting violence in Salinas.  
E. POLICE FORCE 
A police force does not operate in a vacuum.  Police serve to protect a 
community, but the relationship is strained without the community’s trust and support.  
The police depend on the community to report crimes, provide intelligence, and even 
more basic, uphold the social contract.  When any of these items deteriorate, the police 
are put into a position of being reactive as opposed to proactive.  In turn, the community 
deems that the police are not responsive to their needs and trust erodes, further 
perpetuating the vicious cycle. 
To analyze how the police force in Salinas affects violence, the indicators include 
the Salinas PD (SPD) budget, the size of the SPD, and the number of active patrols.  The 
current police-to-resident ratios are 1.67 SPD employees and 1.17 sworn police officers 
per 1,000 residents.  Both the police force and police budget were normalized at a per 
capita rate of 1:1,000 for analysis.  The analysis did not account for time lags, which are 
difficult to quantify or project.  For the police department hypotheses, the time lag refers 
to the amount of time it takes for the violence level to change after officers are either 
hired or released.   
Hypothesis 5a:  If the Salinas PD budget decreases, violence increases.  The 
justification behind this hypothesis that if a police department has fewer monetary 
resources, programs and/or personnel will have to be cut.  Programs include the Police 
Action League and the Community Services Unit, the latter of which is responsible for 
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the neighborhood watch, cadet, and volunteer programs.133  Personnel include both 
sworn and non-sworn members of the SPD. 
This hypothesis is inconclusive.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 
35 percent opposition between Salinas PD budget and violence.134  This means 35 
percent of the time when the SPD budget increased or decreased, violence respectively 
decreased or increased.  Conversely, 65 percent of the time if the SPD budget increased 
or decreased, violence respectively increased or decreased.  Figure 19 shows a 28-year 
comparison of violence and the SPD budget.  Running a linear regression, the correlation 
coefficient is -.258 for the SPD budget and violence.135  In this case a negative 
correlation indicates that the SPD budget and violence are moving in opposition to each 
other, but the overall correlation is weak.  This opposes the positive relationship the 
indicator delta test found.  Because of the disparity, this hypothesis is inconclusive. 
 
 
Figure 19.   Salinas Police Department Budget vs. Violent Crimes136 
                                                 
133 Fetherolf, “90-Day Report,” 40. 
134 See Appendix A, Figure 38. 
135 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
136 Salinas Police Department budget data from the Salinas Department of Finance annual reports.   
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Hypothesis 5b:  If the number of Salinas PD employees decreases, violence 
increases.  The justification for this hypothesis is that without an adequate number of 
police officers for a population, the police will not be able to effectively serve the 
community or deter crime.  Salinas has the second-lowest ratio of sworn police officers 
per capita in Monterey County, even though it has the largest overall population.137  
There was more data available for the number of overall SPD employees than for sworn 
officers, but both groups are analyzed to determine correlations. 
For the overall Salinas PD and violence, the hypothesis is inconclusive.  When 
looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 50 percent opposition between the number of 
SPD employees and violence.138  This means 50 percent of the time when the total 
number of SPD employees increased or decreased, violence respectively decreased or 
increased.  Figure 20 shows a 27-year comparison of violence and the SPD employees.  
Running a linear regression, the correlation coefficient is -.231 for SPD employees and 
violence.139  In this case a negative correlation indicates that the SPD size and violence 
are moving in opposition to each other, but the overall correlation is weak.   
 
 
Figure 20.   Salinas PD Employees Per Capita vs. Violence Rate140 
                                                 
137 Fetherolf, “90-Day Report,” 10. 
138 See Appendix A, Figure 39. 
139 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
140 Data for the Salinas PD employees from the Salinas Department of Finance annual reports.   
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Breaking out just the number of sworn police officers, the hypothesis is still 
inconclusive.  When looking at the indicator deltas, there is a 36 percent opposition 
between sworn Salinas police officers and violence.141  This means 36 percent of the time 
when the sworn Salinas police force increased or decreased, violence respectively 
decreased or increased.  Figure 21 shows a 12-year comparison of violence and the sworn 
Salinas police.  Surprisingly, the correlation coefficient of .223 indicates a positive 
relationship between the number of sworn police officers and violence.142  However, this 
is still a weak correlation and does not indicate a strong relationship between the number 
of sworn police officers and violence.   
Although it seems counter-intuitive that a higher number of sworn police officers 
leads to increased violence, it is important to note the causal relationship between police 
officers and violence.  Typically, if violence increases in a community, the police 
department hires more officers to combat the violence.  In this latter case an increase in 
violence leads to an increase in the size of the police department, which explains the 
positive relationship found in Salinas’ case. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Number of Sworn Police Officers per Capita vs. Violence Rate143 
                                                 
141 See Appendix A, Figure 40. 
142 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
143 Data for the number of sworn Salinas PD officers from the Salinas Department of Finance annual 
reports.   
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Hypothesis 5c:  If the number of Salinas PD active patrols decreases, violence 
increases.  One other hypothesis that considers the number of Salinas PD operations may 
impact violence.  Active patrol refers to police officers “protecting and serving” in the 
neighborhoods and community.  This hypothesis is similar to the number of employed 
police:  more police officers equal more patrols.  More patrols equals more opportunity 
the police can conduct community policing and get to know the area in which they 
operate.  Additionally, interacting with the citizens and patrolling neighborhoods builds 
the community’s trust in the police and increases the likelihood that people will report 
crimes and provide intelligence to the police.  Criminals are less likely to commit crimes 
in areas that have a strong police presence or in neighborhoods that report suspicious 
activity to the police.  However, there was no available data to analyze this hypothesis.   
For the Police Force IV, the data indicates that the causal relationship between the 
police department and violence makes it difficult to truly determine if the Salinas Police 
Department has either a positive or negative affect on violence.  Further research should 
include more years of datasets for the number of sworn police officers, as well as time lag 
considerations that address the changes in violence following force increases and 
decreases over the years.   
F. GANG RIVALRY 
If there is only one gang in a given population, there is no rivalry.  However, with 
the presence of another gang in the same population, competition for areas of operation, 
recruitment, and profits occurs.  This happens not only between rival gangs such as the 
Norteños and Sureños, but also between cliques within each gang.  Although the 
respective cliques for the Norteños and Sureños typically get along with each other, there 
is occasional infighting for control of territory and operations.144   
Unfortunately the data available for the gangs in Salinas is insufficient to identify 
exactly how gang rivalry affects violence.  The hypotheses will be discussed but no 
statistical analysis is offered. 
                                                 
144 CA DOJ, “Gangs Threat Assessment: Salinas, California,” 12. 
 49
Hypothesis 6a:  If the number of rival gangs increases, violence increases.  As 
previously noted, the current estimate of Norteños to Sureños is 60 percent to 40 percent, 
respectively.  Although other gangs have been present in Salinas, such as African-
American gangs and outlaw motorcycle gangs, Hispanic gangs make up the 
overwhelming majority of the gang population in Salinas.145   
The Norteños previously held a monopoly on the city and repeatedly victimized 
the Sureños.  That changed as the number of Sureño cliques increased and became more 
organized.  “As the number of Sureños in Salinas increases, so has the fierce competition 
between the two gangs.  The result has been a spiraling retaliatory-based violence that 
compounds the community’s public safety concerns.”146  There is no doubt that the 
rivalry between the Norteños and Sureños contributes to the overall levels of violence in 
Salinas, even if the relationship is not quantifiable. 
Hypothesis 6b:  If the number of gang cliques increases, violence increases.  
The Salinas PD estimates approximately 21 Hispanic cliques in the city, almost evenly 
divided between the Norteños and Sureños.  However, clique populations and operating 
procedures vary widely.  One Norteño clique, Salinas East Market, has an estimated 
population of 1,000 members and is considered to be extremely violent and well 
organized.147  The Sureño clique Vagos has an estimated 500 members and is one of the 
oldest Sureño cliques in Salinas.148  The smaller Norteño clique Salinas Acosta Plaza has 
an estimated 300 members, but “has a propensity to use lethal force.”149  Another Sureño 
clique, Hebbron, frequently clashes with other Sureño cliques and even wears colors and 
identifiers usually associated with Norteños.150  Similar to Hypothesis 6a, there is no  
 
 
                                                 
145 CA DOJ, “Gangs Threat Assessment: Salinas, California,” 12–13. 
146 Ibid., 1. 
147 Ibid.,  14. 
148 Ibid., 18. 
149 Ibid., 15. 
150 Ibid., 19. 
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doubt that the rivalry between the cliques, whether Norteño-Sureño, Norteño-Norteño, or 
Sureño-Sureño, affects the overall violence levels in Salinas, even if the relationship is 
not quantifiable.   
Although it is highly unlikely that the Salinas PD will ever have statistics for 
every gang member in Salinas, the Gang Rivalry IV warrants further research.  Arrest and 
crime logs with clique information for victims and assailants should be analyzed to 
determine if the gang violence is primarily between related cliques (Norteño vs. Norteño, 
Sureño vs. Sureño), primarily between opponent cliques (Norteño vs. Sureño), or if the 
two types of rivalry are equally violent.  
G. PRISON 
Prison impacts are also difficult to quantify and hypothesize.  Getting tough on 
crime and placing more individuals into prison is not having the effect that the U.S. 
desires.151  Recidivism rates are proof positive of this failure.  In California, a paroled 
prisoner can expect to have a recidivism rate of 68 percent in his or her lifetime.152   
Rehabilitation and time lags are other areas that are difficult to show and project. 
Research has shown that intervention programs, such as rehabilitation, assist in keeping 
prisoners from committing future crimes.  Rehabilitation needs to occur both inside and 
outside of the prison system.  Suppression alone will not prevent a prisoner from 
committing crimes.153  Without rehabilitation, it is more likely that a released prisoner 
will commit another crime.  This is where a time lag occurs.  Similar to the school 
dropout time lag discussion, a time lag in this regard is the amount of time it takes an 
individual to commit a crime after being released from prison.       
                                                 
151 House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, “Gang Crime Prevention and the Need to 
Foster Innovative Solutions at the Federal Level,” October 2, 2007, 2. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/. 
152 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, “Population Reports,” 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/.  Statistic is a compiled average of yearly recidivism rates as listed on the Web site 
reports. 
153 House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, “Gang Crime Prevention,” 81–82.  
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Data for these hypotheses was only found at the state level for California.  
Therefore prison impacts will be discussed, but there is no data to prove or disprove the 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 7a:  If prison rehabilitation programs decrease, violence increases. 
As stated above, intervention programs should be a priority and continuous.  
Opportunities need to be created to assist prisoners in adapting to life outside of prison.  
In some cases, attention toward certain individuals may be constant, whereas other 
individuals may only need a small amount of intervention to adapt.  Research has shown 
that creating this opportunity is the best way to reform individuals and create a safer 
community.154  
Hypothesis 7b:  If the prison recidivism rate increases, violence increases.  The 
recidivism rate is defined as the rate of prisoners rearrested for crimes after being 
released from prison.155  Over the past nine years, the average recidivism rate in 
California for an individual being released and returning to prison within one year is 41 
percent; within two years is 54 percent; and within three years is 58 percent.156  
However, data specific to Salinas was not available to study this hypothesis. 
For the Prison IV, it warrants further research to determine if parolees from 
Salinas Valley State Prison or the Monterey County Jail continue to commit crimes in 
Salinas upon release.  
H. SOCIAL SERVICE PROGRAMS 
Three areas were looked at to understand if social service programs impacted 
violence.  The first is the Salinas social welfare system.  This is the money provided to 
the city from government and non-government organizations to assist needy families.  
The second is the number of social workers assisting the city of Salinas.  Social workers 
are defined as child, family, and school social workers, medical and public health social 
                                                 
154 House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, “Gang Crime Prevention,” 82.  
155 United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Reentry Trends in the U.S., 
Recidivism,” http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/recidivism.htm. 
156 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, “Population Reports.” 
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workers, and mental health and substance abuse social workers.157  The third is the 
amount/type of non-school related programs available to citizens, such as church 
programs, non-profit youth outreach programs, and city-funded programs, such as library 
services and programs offered by the parks and recreation department.  The data found 
for this section is insufficient, with the exception of the library and parks and recreation 
budgets.  These budgets will be used as proxies to measure the non-school related 
programs hypothesis, but the other hypotheses will only be discussed.   
Hypothesis 8a:  If social welfare decreases, violence increases.  The justification 
for this hypothesis is similar to the unemployment hypothesis:  if social welfare benefits 
and assistance are unavailable, the perceived opportunity costs of engaging in illegal 
activity are lower.  Social welfare programs in Monterey County include temporary cash 
assistance programs, Medi-Cal, and food stamps, among others.158 
Data from the Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services 
shows that Salinas residents currently receive 49 percent of the social welfare monetary 
supplements provided to Monterey County.159  Salinas’ population makes up roughly 35 
percent of Monterey County.  Although seemingly out of proportion, these numbers do 
not tell the whole story.  Salinas has one of the highest poverty levels in Monterey 
County, estimated at 15.3 percent in 2008.160  This translates to approximately 23,000 
Salinas residents living below the poverty level.  An estimated 11.3 percent of Monterey 
County’s 405,600 residents were below the poverty line in 2008.161  This translates to 
about 45,800 county residents below the poverty line, of which 23,000 were in Salinas.  
Based on these numbers, Salinas receives social welfare benefits and assistance in line 
with its poverty base. 
                                                 
157 United States Department of Labor, “Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2008-09 Edition,” April 
14, 2007, http://www.bls.gov/. 
158 Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services, “Community Benefits,” 
http://mcdses.co.monterey.ca.us/benefits/ (accessed December 7, 2009). 
159 Data from the Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services. 
160 U.S. Census Bureau, “Fact Sheet: Salinas City, California,” http://factfinder.census.gov/. 
161 U.S. Census Bureau, “Fact Sheet: Monterey County, California,” http://factfinder.census.gov/. 
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Social welfare data was not available for previous years to test how Salinas’ 
social welfare amount correlates with violence.   
Hypothesis 8b:  If the number of social workers decreases, violence increases.  
The justification for this hypothesis is that if the number of social workers per capita in a 
population decreases, there is less human supply for the population’s demands.  This 
could translate to delayed responses to requested need, home or welfare visits, or 
processing benefits.  If a person in need does not receive expected monetary or social 
welfare benefits in a timely manner, once again the perceived opportunity costs of 
engaging in illegal activity are lower. 
Over the past five years there has been an average of 690 social workers at the 
Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services.  Each of these social 
workers handled an average of 161 cases in the same time frame.  This equates to 
110,900 cases in Monterey County during that 5-year period.162  However, the data does 
not indicate if any of the social workers were assigned solely to Salinas, or how many of 
the cases were specifically for Salinas residents.  The data for Monterey County would be 
insufficient as a proxy because of Salinas’ requirement for a higher proportion of social 
welfare need, as described in Hypothesis 8a. 
Hypothesis 8c:  If the number of non-school programs decreases, violence 
increases.  The justification for this hypothesis is that youths are less likely to engage in 
violent behavior if they have positive alternatives.  In Los Angeles, city officials realized 
that gang violence peaked in July and August during the timeframe from 4pm to midnight 
on Wednesdays through Saturdays.163  In 2008, the city kept recreation centers open until 
midnight during those four days in the eight neighborhoods with the highest crime rates.  
The resulting statistics were impressive:  the neighborhoods saw a 17 percent drop in 
overall violent crime, including an 86 percent decrease in homicides and a 23 percent 
decrease in aggravated assaults.164 
                                                 
162 Data from the Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services. 
163 Boris Weintraub, “New Weapons in the Fight Against Gangs,” Parks & Recreation 44 (November 
2009), 46. 
164 Ibid., 46–47. 
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The biggest problem for non-school programs is funding.  Multiple programs in 
Salinas received funding from local, city, state, and federal agencies over the years; 
however, the resources were not sustained.  The Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative 
grant expired without replacement funds; Partners for Peace lost their funding; and 
PeaceBuilders expired due to licensing issues.165  In 2008 Salinas funded a $1 million 
program for one year to boost after-school and prevention/intervention programs, but it is 
too soon to say if the programs are impacting violence, or if they will retain funding and 
last.  One other prevention and intervention source for at-risk youths is the church.  
Several churches offer voluntary assistance with after-school and homework programs. 
Pastor Frank Gomez, an advocate for such programs, is trying to rally more churches to 
assist in similar programs to prevent youth from joining gangs.166 
Without complete data for all of the non-school programs, there is no way to 
measure and accurately assess this hypothesis.  However, there is sufficient data for the 
budgets for both the parks and recreation services and library services.  The budgets for 
these services can act as proxies to determine if non-school programs deter violence.  The 
budgets have been normalized to represent dollars per 1,000 residents.   
When looking at the indicator deltas between the parks and recreation budget and 
violence, there is a 41 percent opposition.167  This means 41 percent of the time when the 
parks and recreation budget increased or decreased, violence respectively decreased or 
increased.  Figure 22 shows a 26-year comparison of the parks and recreation budget and 
violence.  When utilizing the time-series regression, the data also shows an inconclusive 
hypothesis.  Although negative, the coefficient is essentially zero, indicating no 
significant relationship between the parks and recreation budget and violence.168 
 
                                                 
165 Stahl, “Saving Salinas.”  
166 Stahl, “Saving Salinas.” 
167 See Appendix A, Figure 41. 
168 See Appendix B, Table 2. 
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Figure 22.   Salinas Parks & Recreation Budget vs. Violence Rate169 
When looking at the indicator deltas between the library budget and violence, 
there is a 37 percent opposition.170  This means 37 percent of the time when the library 
budget increased or decreased, violence respectively decreased or increased.  Figure 23 
shows a 26-year comparison of the library budget and violence.  Running a linear 
regression, the correlation coefficient between the library budget and violence is .177.171  
Between the indicator deltas and the correlation coefficient, it appears that the library 
budget actually has a positive relationship with violence:  if the library budget increases, 
violence also increases.  However, this relationship requires further research based on 
who is utilizing the library’s services.   
 
                                                 
169 Data for the Parks and Recreation budget from the Salinas Department of Finance annual reports. 
170 See Appendix A, Figure 42. 
171 See Appendix C, Table 3. 
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Figure 23.   Salinas Library Budget vs. Violence Rate172 
Using the proxy comparisons for the parks and recreation and library budgets, it is 
inconclusive whether non-school programs actually deter violence.  Further research in 
this area is required, particularly research centered on who is utilizing the parks and 
recreation and library programs.  If these programs are primarily patronized by children 
and adults who are not involved in violent crimes or gangs, then it is logical that these 
programs would not significantly impact the level of violent crime in Salinas. 
For the Social Services IV, all of the indicators and hypotheses require further 
analysis if and when the datasets become available to determine if these programs are 
negatively correlated with violence.   
I. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 
Without the active participation of the community, there is no ownership of the 
city.  There are two areas of measurement for community involvement.  The first is 
Neighborhood Watch.  This is measured by the amount of neighborhoods that have an 
organized group that assists the police with criminal or suspicious reporting and 
community policing.  The second is the amount of calls made by the public to the police 
                                                 
172 Data for the library budget from the Salinas Department of Finance annual reports. 
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to report violent incidences.  Without reporting or information from the citizenry, the 
police will not have enough intelligence to pursue violent criminals and make arrests.     
Hypothesis 9a:  If the number of neighborhood watch programs decreases, 
violence increases.  Data was not available regarding the overall number of 
neighborhood watch programs, but the only significant neighborhood watch area is in 
south Salinas.173  Former Salinas Chief of Police Dan Ortega stressed the need for more 
community involvement and for individuals to report criminal or gang activity.174  
Current Salinas Chief of Police Louis Fetherolf agrees with his predecessor and sees a 
need for neighborhoods and the Salinas PD to work together.175  However, a lack of 
funding may cause the Salinas PD to disband the Community Service Unit, which assists 
neighborhoods in organizing neighborhood watch and volunteer programs.176  
Hypothesis 9b:  If the number of Priority One police calls decreases, violence 
increases.  The Salinas Police department has four categories of calls, with Priority One 
calls designated for emergencies with life-threatening injuries or violence.  In 2008, three 
percent of the 116,303 calls made to the Salinas PD were Priority One.177  This 
corresponds to an average of only 8 Priority One calls out of 318 total calls each day.   
The lack of violent crime reporting in Salinas has multiple factors:  a fear of 
retaliation; a code of honor among gang members; multi-generational gang families who 
protect each other; and a language barrier for migrants and immigrants.178  Additionally, 
many migrants and immigrants fear the police based on either cultural perceptions, or the 
assumption that the police will report them to Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  
When a community lives in fear of either the criminals or the police, it is unlikely that the  
 
                                                 
173 “Monterey Park Neighborhood Watch 2009: Meeting Discussion Guide,” July 22, 2009, 
http://montereyparksblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/Neighborhood_Watch_Strategies_Objectives_Actions.pdf. 
174 Stahl, “Saving Salinas.”  
175 Fetherolf, “90-Day Report,” 7. 
176 Ibid., 40. 
177 Ibid., 12.  For 2008, 2,995 out of 116,303 calls were Priority One.  
178 Stahl, “Saving Salinas.”  
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citizens will involve themselves in community policing.  Although the authors were 
unable to get full calling data for this hypothesis, it should be available from the Salinas 
PD for further research. 
For the Community Involvement IV, more research is required to determine the 
correlations between community involvement and violence.  Further research 
opportunities include obtaining more data on the Neighborhood Watch Programs 
established in Salinas, and analyzing these areas with respect to violence on a smaller 
geographic scale, such as by Police Area Command.  Another research area is analyzing 
the number of Priority One calls over time to determine if an increase in Priority One 
calls is correlated with a decrease in violence. 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Mayor Dennis Donahue has a four-fold strategy for peace in Salinas:  prevention, 
intervention, an expanded police department, and enhanced community engagement.179  
Applying the research findings from this thesis to the appropriate category of the four-
fold strategy, the authors offer the following recommendations to help lower the violence 
rate in Salinas. 
1. Prevention 
In a community plagued by violence and gangs, prevention is a key tactic.  
Youths and young adults need to believe that they can lead successful, productive, and 
healthy lives.  Maturing with this mindset will reduce the attraction of resorting to 
violence or joining a gang.  Based on the research findings, education and employment 
are two significant areas that can help youths and young adults achieve this mindset, and 
prevent violence. 
Of all of the independent variables tested, education is the most highly correlated 
with violence.  A higher dropout rate corresponds with an increase in violence.  
Conversely, higher graduation rates, average daily attendance rates, and school budgets 
are correlated with lower levels of violence.  These four indicators are highly interrelated:  
if children stay in school and graduate, the dropout rate decreases, and the graduation 
rate, average daily attendance, and school budgets all increase.  Although increasing the 
graduation rate will not happen overnight, focusing on this environmental factor appears 
to offer the most proverbial bang for the buck. 
Multiple programs were used in the past to keep children in school and provide a 
safe learning environment, particularly the umbrella of programs under the Safe 
School/Healthy Students Initiative.  In 2003, a cost analysis study evaluated the 
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 60
effectiveness of the Safe Schools Environment (SSE) element under the SS/HS Initiative 
for Salinas.180  The SSE element consisted of the school resource officer (SRO) program, 
which addressed safety and bullying within the schools, and the School Attendance 
Enforcement Program (SEAP), which targeted chronic truants.  The analysis concluded 
that the SSE element was not only cost effective, but it also had a positive impact on both 
the students involved and the overall Salinas community.  Furthermore, the analysis 
showed a positive return of investment for the city.181  Unfortunately, the SEAP program 
was discontinued and five of the ten SROs were cut due to a lack of funding after the 
grant expired.182  As previously discussed, a lack of funding also curtailed other 
education-related programs under the SS/HS Initiative.  Although funding will be a 
problem for any program recommended to help lower violence, education pursuits should 
be given priority for funding.   
Employment is another area that provides prevention benefits.  However, given 
the current state of the economy, it will be difficult to create new or more jobs in order to 
reduce the unemployment rate at the present time.  The October 2009 unemployment rate 
for Salinas was 19 percent, well above the Monterey County average of 13.7 percent.183  
Although daunting, this area still requires attention to help lower violence levels.  
Additionally, city officials must anticipate that if unemployment increases, violence is 
also likely to increase.  For the future, this translates to having a contingency plan in 
place if the unemployment rate spikes again.  This contingency plan could include more 
police patrols as a proactive measure against violence, emergency funds to help the local 
citizens, food banks, and shelters, or job placement assistance to help laid-off workers.    
The housing correlations from the research indicate that extended family networks 
are important to reducing violence in Salinas.  Violence decreases when the average 
persons per household increases, suggesting that larger and extended families are a 
                                                 
180 Michael J. Zerbo et al, “Cost Avoidance Analysis, Safe School Environment Program City of 
Salinas, California” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003). http://www.dtic.mil/.   
181 Ibid., v. 
182 Fetherolf, “90-Day Report,” 25. 
183 KION, “Monterey County Unemployment Snapshot,” 
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deterrence to violence.  Salinas tried to capitalize on family bonds in 2007 by recruiting 
local grandmothers to help influence the decisions and lifestyles of children and young 
adults.  The grandmother figure is an important part of the Hispanic culture, usually 
highly revered and respected.  Salinas hoped that a grandmother brigade could help 
prevent gang involvement by youths.184  The grandmother brigade did not materialize, 
but concepts like this should be explored further and implemented.  Utilizing family ties 
to fight violence will not work in all cases, particularly for the multi-generational gang 
families.  But if family involvement and mobilization can prevent the majority of at-risk 
youths from joining gangs, violence should decrease. 
2. Intervention 
In addition to preventing youths from joining a gang or resorting to violence, 
intervention programs are required to offer productive and safe alternatives to those 
already engaged in violent behavior or gangs.  Similar to prevention, intervention 
programs that develop education and employment skills are in line with the findings of 
this thesis.  However, many of the postulated relationships that involve intervention, such 
as rehabilitation programs in the prisons and non-school programs, were not statistically 
measured because of a lack of data.  Some of these programs will be discussed, but 
further research is required to fully assess their impact on violence levels in Salinas. 
One alternative is training programs with long-lasting effects, such as vocational 
training.  Vocational training offers both educational and job skills, skills that can be 
utilized in the job market as soon as the training is complete.  Therefore, vocational 
training addresses both the employment and education correlations found in the research.  
Other programs that involve both education and employment skills should be 
implemented to offer legitimate alternatives to at-risk youths, former gang members, and 
prior offenders.   
Established programs in Salinas that focus on intervention through counseling, 
education, employment, and rehabilitation must be fostered and funded.  Similar to the 
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education emphasis with respect to prevention, successful programs such as the 
California Youth Outreach185 or Second Chance186 must receive support and funding 
from the community.  It is not enough to say that a city is committed to reducing 
violence; the city must also make the hard decisions about where to focus its resources.  
If California Youth Outreach and Second Chance are more likely to impact the violence 
levels and keep youths out of gangs or jail, then the resources for other programs, such as 
the parks and recreation department, library, or police department, should be reallocated.   
3. Expanded Police Department 
Although the findings in this thesis regarding the Salinas Police Department and 
violence are inconclusive, it is important to note the relationship between violence and 
the police.  If violence increases, cities typically put more money into the police budget 
for more officers, enhanced technologies, and more equipment.  On the other hand, one 
would expect that an increase in police officers will result in a decrease in violence.  In 
other words, more police are both a response to higher levels of violence and a cause of 
lower levels of violence.  This notion, that the police force and violence hold a causal 
relationship in both directions, is likely what led to the inconclusive findings reported 
above.  The recommendations presented here are reflective of the hypothesis that a larger 
police force will deter violence. 
The police need to have a permanent presence in the areas with the most violent 
activity.  For Salinas, these areas are primarily in the east part of Salinas.  Salinas should 
operate a fully functioning police substation in the center of gang and violent activity in 
east Salinas.  The Salinas PD worked out of east Salinas in the past, but the building was 
run-down and the substation was only for police officers; residents still had to go to the 
                                                 
185 California Youth Outreach is an intervention agency located in five gang-infested cities in 
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main police office building in downtown Salinas to file police reports.187  The 
expectation is that a fully functioning substation manned 24/7 will act as a deterrent to 
violence and gang activity.  First, the police will have a permanent and continuous 
presence in an area plagued by violence.  Second, the reaction time to respond to 
shootings and violent acts will be shorter because the substation is closer to the “hot 
spots.”  Third, the police will be closer to the community most affected by violence, and 
can begin to forge positive relationships and trust.  It may take several months or even 
years before the community in east Salinas trusts the police enough to provide 
intelligence regarding violent crime and gang activity.  However, once the community 
begins to trust the police and provide information, the violent criminals and gangs will 
lose the ability to operate freely in the city. 
During his tenure as a military advisor, John Waghelstein pointed out “[if] the 
people see the army as part of the solution and not as a threat, the guerrillas lose.”188  
Substitute military with police and insurgents with gangs and the concept is the same.  
Waghelstein also points out that “self-assessment is hard but necessary.”189  The Salinas 
policymakers, police, and citizens need to reassess what is truly important with respect to 
the police department:  more police officers and technologies, or a different approach to 
policing.     
4. Enhanced Community Engagement 
Although data was not available for the Community Involvement IV, the authors 
firmly believe that positive relationships between city officials in Salinas and the 
population are crucial for undermining the violence and gang problems.  Community 
engagements are critical in building rapport and gaining trust, but can also be used as a 
passive technique to elicit information in an informal manner.  The community knows 
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information, and when put in the right situation individuals may divulge information that 
can assist police investigations.190  Community engagements can range from local food 
drives, blood drives, Police and Fire Department displays, mingling with people at 
community block parties, or speaking to people at a neighborhood watch meeting.  Any 
opportunity to be among the people to build trust should be used by city officials in order 
to strengthen the relationship within the community.   
The most common community engagement is the neighborhood watch program.  
Communities with structured and involved neighborhoods typically are more organized 
and have less crime.191  In San Jose, California, the primary focus in fighting gang 
activity is community involvement and neighborhood watch programs.  Through the 
neighborhood watch programs, trust, civility, and defragmentation of neighborhoods 
occurs.192  
San Jose also operates the Mayor's Gang Prevention Task Force (MGPTF), an 
endeavor led by the Department of Parks, Recreation, and Neighborhood Services.  The 
MGPTF is broken into four different regional divisions.  Each division is comprised of 
multiple city, school, and non-profit organizations that meet every two months to discuss 
strategies and determine the status of gang activity.193  This mix of community 
involvement has proved effective for San Jose.  Salinas needs to identify their correct 
level of community involvement.  Violence can be prevented but it takes backing from 
the community to make prevention effective and lasting. 
B. CONCLUSION  
Table 1 is a summary of results found during the research for this thesis.  All of 
the indicators are hypothesized to result in an increase of violence.  Of the fourteen 
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measured indicators, six are confirmed, two are refuted, and six are inconclusive.  Of the 
two hypotheses refuted, the average persons per household and housing units per capita, 
these indicators do affect violence, but in a manner opposite of the relationship that the 
authors hypothesized.  In other words, both of these indicators negatively affect violence, 
not positively as hypothesized. 
 
Violence Indicator:   Scatter Plot Correlation Results 
Salinas Budget Decreases 42% -0.012 Inconclusive  
Salinas Retail Sales Decreases 37% -0.205 Inconclusive 
Unemployment Increases 67% 0.235 Confirmed 
Average House Price Increases 44% -0.567 Inconclusive 
Person Per Household 
Increases 
33% -0.813 Refuted; Indicator 
negatively affects violence 
Vacant Units Increases 67% 0.791 Confirmed 
Housing Units Decrease 33% 0.795 Refuted; Indicator 
negatively affects violence 
HS Dropout Rate Increases 69% 0.446 Confirmed 
HS Graduation Rate Decreases 63% -0.759 Confirmed 
HS Daily Attendance 
Decreases 
67% -0.472 Confirmed 
 
HS Budget Decreases 60% -0.849 Confirmed 
SPD Budget Decreases 35% -0.258 Inconclusive  
SPD Employees Decreases 50% -0.231 Inconclusive  
SPD Sworn Police Decreases 36% 0.223 Inconclusive (subset of SPD 
Employees hypothesis) 
Parks & Recreation Budget 
Decreases 
41% 0.051 Inconclusive (proxy for 
non-school programs) 
Library Budget Decreases 33% 0.177 Inconclusive (proxy for 
non-school programs) 
Table 1.   Thesis Results Summary 
Areas that show confirmed affects on violence are unemployment, education, and 
housing.  When Salinas implements a strategy to reduce violence and gang activity, these 
three areas must be addressed. 
As the data indicates, violence is lower when unemployment rates are lower.  If 
Salinas can provide jobs as part of their prevention and intervention programs, the 
violence levels should decrease.  Although homicides were not the focus of this thesis, 
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the data also indicates that there is an increase in homicides when there is an increase in 
unemployment.  Although there are many motivating factors for committing homicide, 
the data indicates that unemployment is one of those factors.     
The data from this research shows that higher school attendance and graduation 
results in lower violence.  This indicates that programs concentrated on reducing high 
school dropout rates, and increasing daily attendance and high school graduation rates, 
will result in a decrease in violence.   
The third area that affects violence is housing.  The data indicates that to reduce 
violence there should be more people per household living in fewer houses per 1,000 
residents.  However, it is not safe or logical to recommend that more people be inserted 
into a geographical space to reduce violence.  These areas require further analysis, 
particularly centered on either census tracts or Salinas Police Department Area 
Commands.  Vacant units also positively affect violence, and this area should be 
explored.  Securing vacant buildings is a “cost-effective crime-control tactic for 
distressed neighborhoods.”194 
Although this research provides a positive start to understanding environmental 
factors that affect violence levels in Salinas, California, more research is needed to 
identify the overall affects that various socio-economic factors and violence have on each 
other.  Once the full extent of why violence occurs is understood, officials and 
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APPENDIX A – SCATTERPLOTS  
This appendix contains the scatterplots of the change of each indicator versus the 
change in violence for each year of available data.  The deltas were calculated for each 
year of available data, then plotted against each other on an X-Y scatterplot.  For 
example, for the hypothesis, “If the unemployment rate increases, violence increases,” 
one would expect to see most of the scatterplot points in the negative-negative or 
positive-positive quadrants.  This would indicate that when the unemployment rate 
increases or decreases, violence respectively increases or decreases.  A preponderance of 
points in either of the positive-negative quadrants would serve to disprove the hypothesis 
because the unemployment and violence rates are moving in opposition to each other.  
Referencing the data in Section II, the percentage of similarity (positive relationship) or 
opposition (negative relationship) for each hypothesis is included, as well as whether the 
hypothesis is confirmed, refuted, or inconclusive.   
 
Hypothesis 1a:  If the spending budget of Salinas decreases, violence increases:   
42% opposition, hypothesis inconclusive. 
 
Figure 24.   Violence vs. City Budget Scatterplot 
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Hypothesis 1b:  If retail sales decrease, violence increases:  37% opposition, 
hypothesis inconclusive. 
 
Figure 25.   Violence vs. Retail Sales Scatterplot 
 
Hypothesis 1c:  If unemployment rates increase, violence increases:  67% 
similarity, hypothesis confirmed. 
 
Figure 26.   Violence vs. Unemployment Scatterplot 
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Homicide and unemployment rate:  72% similarity, no stated hypothesis. 
 
Figure 27.   Homicide vs. Unemployment Scatterplot 
 
Raw population and raw violence:  68% similarity, no stated hypothesis. 
 




Hypothesis 3a:  If the housing market increases, violence increases:  44% 
similarity, hypothesis inconclusive. 
 
Figure 29.   Violence vs. Average House Price Scatterplot 
 
Homicide and housing market:  78% opposition (no stated hypothesis). 
 
Figure 30.   Homicides vs. Average House Price Scatterplot 
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Hypothesis 3b:  If the average number of persons per household increases, 
violence increases:  33% similarity, hypothesis refuted.  (67% opposition, therefore 
persons per household negatively affects violence). 
 
Figure 31.   Violence vs. Persons Per Household Scatterplot 
 
Hypothesis 3c:  If the amount of vacant units increases, violence increases:  
67% similarity, hypothesis confirmed. 
 
Figure 32.   Violence vs. Number of Vacant Housing Units Scatterplot  
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Hypothesis 3d:  If housing units per capita decreases, violence increases:  33% 
opposition, hypothesis relationship refuted.  (67% similarity, therefore housing units per 
capita positively affects violence.)     
 
Figure 33.   Violence vs. Housing Density Scatterplot 
 
Hypothesis 4a:  If the dropout rate increases, violence increases:  69% 
similarity, hypothesis confirmed. 
 
Figure 34.   Violence vs. High School Dropout Rate Scatterplot 
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Hypothesis 4b:  If the graduation rate decreases, violence increases:  63% 
opposition, hypothesis inconclusive.  (Hypothesis confirmed with -.759 regression 
correlation coefficient). 
 
Figure 35.   Violence vs. Graduation Rate Scatterplot 
 
Hypothesis 4c:  If the average daily attendance decreases, violence increases:  
67% opposition, hypothesis confirmed. 
 
Figure 36.   Violence vs. Average Daily Attendance Rate Scatterplot 
 74
Hypothesis 4d:  If the school budget per student decreases, violence increases:  
60% similarity, hypothesis inconclusive.  (Hypothesis confirmed with -.849 correlation 
coefficient.) 
 
Figure 37.   Violence vs. High School Budget Scatterplot 
 
Hypothesis 5a:  If the Salinas Police Department budget decreases, violence 
increases:  35% opposition, hypothesis refuted.  (Hypothesis inconclusive with -.258 
correlation coefficient). 
 
Figure 38.   Violence vs. Salinas PD Budget Scatterplot 
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Hypothesis 5b:  If the number of Salinas Police Department employees 
decreases, violence increases:  50% similarity (opposition), hypothesis inconclusive. 
 
Figure 39.   Violence vs. Total Number of Salinas PD Employees Scatterplot 
 
Sworn police officers and violence:  36% opposition, no stated hypothesis. 
 
Figure 40.   Violence vs. Number of Salinas PD Sworn Officers Scatterplot 
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Hypothesis 8c:  If the number of non-school programs decreases, violence 
increases:  Proxy comparison of Parks & Recreation Budget, 41% opposition, hypothesis 
inconclusive. 
 
Figure 41.   Violence vs. Parks & Recreation Budget Scatterplot  
 
Hypothesis 8c:  If the number of non-school programs decreases, violence 
increases:  Proxy comparison of Library Budget, 37% opposition, hypothesis 
inconclusive. 
 
Figure 42.   Violence vs. Library Budget Scatterplot 
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APPENDIX B – TIME-SERIES REGRESSION COMPARISON 
To identify if combining multiple socio-economic factors impacted violence, the 
authors started with a static time-series regression.  Conducting this analysis identified 
whether or not the socio-economic factors deter violence.  Positive coefficients are 
interpreted as contributing factors to the level of violence.  On the other hand, negative 
coefficients are interpreted as deterrents to the level of violence.  Contributing factors 
include the population, the unemployment rate, the high school dropout rate, and housing 
units per 1,000 residents.  Deterrent factors include the Salinas city budget, the Salinas 
Police budget, and the Salinas Park and Recreation budget. 
Not all variables were tested from the thesis.  First, a series of correlations among 
each independent variable’s (IV) indicators were compared.  This comparison ruled out 
similarly correlated indicators.  If the indicators were highly correlated then only one 
indicator represented the overall IV.  If there were any indicators that were not correlated, 
then the IV would be represented by each of the indicators.  However, the indicators 
would represent a separate socio-economic factor within the time-series model.   
In the static model, evidence of positive serial correlation indicated that each 
year’s data points affected the subsequent years’ variations.  A Durbin-Watson statistic195 
was conducted.  In order to isolate the individual weight of each variable, the Cochrane-
Orcutt196 dynamic model was conducted on the same data.  In both models when the 
coefficient is negative, violence is being deterred.  Also in both of the models a lower  
P-Value197 represents a more robust or accurate account that the variable will portray the 
same affect over time.  For example, the community budget had a negative coefficient, 
meaning that when there is more budget per 1,000 residents, violence is deterred.  The 
                                                 
195 Durbin-Watson: A statistic test used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals from 
a regression analysis. Values higher than 2 are desirable; values less than 2 indicate evidence of positive 
serial correlation.  NLREG, “Understanding the Results of an Analysis,” http://www.nlreg.com/results.htm.   
196 Cochrane-Orcutt: An algorithm for estimating a time-series linear regression in the presence of 
auto correlated errors. About.com, “Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation,” 
http://economics.about.com/library/glossary/bldef-cochrane-orcutt-estimation.htm. 
197 P-Value: The probability of obtaining a test statistic at least as extreme as the one that was actually 
observed.  Wikipedia, “P-Value,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-value. 
 78
community budget also has a low P-Value, meaning that the data set is consistently 
showing that when the budget increases violence is deterred.  
 
Static Model Dynamic Model 
Coefficient 0.165 Coefficient 0.021 Population P-Value 0.001 Population P-Value 0.827 
Coefficient 0.842 Coefficient 0.363 Unemployment P-Value 0.012 Unemployment P-Value 0.164 
Coefficient 4.37E-06 Coefficient 2.10E-07 City Budget P-Value 0.053 City Budget P-Value 0.918 
Coefficient 27.179 Coefficient 11.978 Dropout Rate P-Value 0.405 Dropout Rate P-Value 0.671 
Coefficient -0.00002 Coefficient 6.48E-08 Police Budget P-Value 0.067 Police Budget P-Value 0.997 
Coefficient -0.0003 Coefficient -0.0001 Parks & Rec 
Budget P-Value 0.003 
Parks & Rec 
Budget P-Value 0.126 






Table 2.   Durbin-Watson Coefficients and P-Values 
Looking at the dynamic model analysis, unemployment and the high school drop-
out rate have a strong impact on violence.  Population and housing units are almost in 
equilibrium with violence, as they are both positive but relatively close to zero.  City 
budget, police budget and community budgets are also close to zero, however they are 
negative, which does cause some deterrence toward violence.  This does not mean that 
more money will deter more violence.  It shows the propensity that the management of 
the respective budgets may assist in the deterrence of violence.  For example more police 
conducting community policing and/or more alternatives such as sports and recreation 
programs funded by the parks and recreation department.  While the statistical results are 
not very strong they do indicate patterns that either deter or contribute to violence. 
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APPENDIX C – LINEAR REGRESSION CORRELATION 
Table 3 displays the linear regression data for each socio-economic factor versus 
homicides and overall violence.  
 
Correlation:    Violence Homicide Significance 
Salinas Budget -0.012 0.310 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
Salinas Retail Sales -0.204 0.197 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
Unemployment rate 0.235 0.559 Positive correlation favors hypothesis 
Population (Overall) -0.012  0.202 No stated hypothesis 
Population (1980-1994) 0.883 0.304 No stated hypothesis 
Population (1995-2008) -0.927 -0.028 No stated hypothesis 
Average House Price -0.567  -0.692 Positive correlation favors hypothesis 
Average Condo Price  -0.454 -0.758 Positive correlation favors hypothesis 
Person Per Household -0.813 0.002 Positive correlation favors hypothesis 
Vacant Units 0.791 0.003 Positive correlation favors hypothesis 
Housing Units  0.795 -0.008 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
HS Dropout Rate 0.446 0.019 Positive correlation favors hypothesis 
HS Graduation Rate -0.759 -0.361 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
HS Daily Attendance -0.472 -0.212 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
HS Budget -0.849 -0.232 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
SPD Budget -0.258 0.110 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
SPD Employees -0.231 -0.382 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
SPD Sworn Police 0.223 0.106 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
Parks & Rec Budget 0.051 -0.105 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
Library Budget 0.177 0.467 Negative correlation favors hypothesis
Table 3.   Linear Regression Correlation Coefficients 
Table 4 displays the raw data, per capita data, and percentages for the respected 
categories of homicides, robbery, assaults and overall violence as outlined in the Thesis.  
For the headers, P is population, H is homicide, R is robbery, A is assault, V is overall 






Year P H H / PC 
H% 




V A A / PC 
A% of 
V V V / PC 
1980 80438 9 0.112 1.8% 208 2.59 41.6% 283 3.52 56.6% 500 6.22 
1981 82700 9 0.109 1.6% 191 2.31 35.1% 344 4.16 63.2% 544 6.58 
1982 85300 11 0.129 2.0% 179 2.10 32.8% 356 4.17 65.2% 546 6.40 
1983 87600 2 0.023 0.4% 200 2.28 34.8% 372 4.25 64.8% 574 6.55 
1984 91100 8 0.088 1.5% 159 1.75 30.1% 362 3.97 68.4% 529 5.81 
1985 94600 10 0.106 1.7% 167 1.77 27.8% 424 4.48 70.6% 601 6.35 
1986 98300 9 0.092 1.0% 204 2.08 23.1% 672 6.84 75.9% 885 9.00 
1987 100800 7 0.069 0.8% 192 1.91 23.1% 633 6.28 76.1% 832 8.25 
1988 103900 4 0.039 0.4% 217 2.09 23.0% 722 6.95 76.6% 943 9.08 
1989 105400 7 0.066 0.7% 217 2.06 22.7% 734 6.96 76.6% 958 9.09 
1990 108777 11 0.101 1.0% 262 2.41 24.9% 778 7.15 74.0% 1051 9.66 
1991 111184 7 0.063 0.7% 253 2.28 23.8% 805 7.24 75.6% 1065 9.58 
1992 114736 17 0.148 1.5% 388 3.38 34.4% 722 6.29 64.1% 1127 9.82 
1993 116686 15 0.129 1.1% 560 4.80 39.5% 844 7.23 59.5% 1419 12.16 
1994 120885 24 0.199 1.9% 414 3.43 32.2% 846 7.00 65.9% 1284 10.62 
1995 121960 15 0.123 1.0% 494 4.05 33.9% 950 7.79 65.1% 1459 11.96 
1996 124972 8 0.064 0.6% 412 3.30 31.6% 884 7.07 67.8% 1304 10.43 
1997 127369 18 0.141 1.4% 348 2.73 27.6% 895 7.03 71.0% 1261 9.90 
1998 132449 17 0.128 1.5% 440 3.32 39.4% 661 4.99 59.1% 1118 8.44 
1999 136797 13 0.095 1.2% 346 2.53 31.6% 737 5.39 67.2% 1096 8.01 
2000 142685 18 0.126 1.5% 443 3.11 37.1% 734 5.14 61.4% 1195 8.38 
2001 144728 15 0.104 1.2% 399 2.76 32.9% 799 5.52 65.9% 1213 8.38 
2002 146659 20 0.136 1.9% 367 2.50 34.0% 692 4.72 64.1% 1079 7.36 
2003 148117 19 0.128 1.7% 399 2.69 34.9% 725 4.90 63.4% 1143 7.72 
2004 149838 17 0.114 1.5% 452 3.02 39.4% 678 4.53 59.1% 1147 7.66 
2005 149626 7 0.047 0.7% 335 2.24 33.9% 645 4.31 65.4% 987 6.60 
2006 148707 7 0.047 0.7% 383 2.58 35.7% 683 4.59 63.7% 1073 7.22 
2007 148782 14 0.094 1.3% 378 2.54 34.3% 711 4.78 64.5% 1103 7.41 
2008 150898 25 0.166 2.5% 334 2.21 33.7% 633 4.20 63.8% 992 6.57 
AVERAGE: 12.52 0.103 1.3% 322 2.65 32.2% 666 5.57 66.6% 1001 8.32 
Table 4.   Thesis Violence Data198 
                                                 
198 Thesis violence is based on the amount of homicides, robberies, and assaults occurring in Salinas 
each year.  Population data from the California Department of Finance Web site, http://www.dof.ca.gov/.  
Violence data from the USDOJ Web site, http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/. 
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